Constitutional economics is applied in its positive and normative aspects on the European unification process and to develop some proposals for constitutional rules. It is shown why this approach is applicable and how some aspects of this process are in line with constitutional economics. The Maastricht treaty about the EMU is analyzed under this perspective. Fiscal rules are developed concerning the assignment of direct (progressive) and indirect (proportional) taxes on different governmental levels. It is concluded by some remarks concerning other fields where, and reasons why, constitutional economics could and should be made fruitful in discourses about the European process. Copyright 1994 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Kyklos.
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