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Constitutional Economics and Its Relevance for the Evolution of Rules

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  • Kirchgassner, Gebhard

Abstract

Constitutional economics is applied in its positive and normative aspects on the European unification process and to develop some proposals for constitutional rules. It is shown why this approach is applicable and how some aspects of this process are in line with constitutional economics. The Maastricht treaty about the EMU is analyzed under this perspective. Fiscal rules are developed concerning the assignment of direct (progressive) and indirect (proportional) taxes on different governmental levels. It is concluded by some remarks concerning other fields where, and reasons why, constitutional economics could and should be made fruitful in discourses about the European process. Copyright 1994 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.

Volume (Year): 47 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 321-39

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Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:47:y:1994:i:3:p:321-39

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962

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Cited by:
  1. Lars P. Feld, 2004. "The European Constitution Project from the Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200415, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  2. Schneider, Friedrich G., 2009. "Is a Federal European Constitution for an enlarged European Union necessary? Some preliminary suggestions using public choice analysis," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 83, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  3. Feld, Lars P, 2000. " Tax Competition and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis for Switzerland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 125-64, October.
  4. Lucia Quaglia, 2003. "European Monetary Integration and the ‘Constitutionalization’ of Macroeconomic Policy Making," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 235-251, September.
  5. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 1998. "The Double Dividend Debate: Some Comments from a Politico-Economic Perspective," Empirica, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 37-48, January.
  6. Feld, Lars P. & Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2000. "Direct democracy, political culture, and the outcome of economic policy: a report on the Swiss experience," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 287-306, June.
  7. Kirchgassner, Gebhard & Pommerehne, Werner W., 1996. "Tax harmonization and tax competition in the European Union: Lessons from Switzerland," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 351-371, June.
  8. Kirchgässner, Gebhard, 2012. "Sanfter Paternalismus, meritorische Güter, und der normative Individualismus," Economics Working Paper Series 1217, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  9. Schneider, Friedrich G., 2009. "Is a Federal European Constitution for an enlarged European Union necessary? Some preliminary suggestions using public choice analysis," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 83, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  10. Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2004. "The Role of Direct Democracy in the European Union," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200423, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  11. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2014. "Soft Paternalism, Merit Goods, and Normative Individualism," CESifo Working Paper Series 4688, CESifo Group Munich.

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