Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States
AbstractA rich array of institutional diversity makes the United States an excellent place to study the relationship between political institutions and public policy outcomes. This essay has three main aims. It reviews empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional rules, political representation and policy outcomes; it aims to place the literature into a broader context of theoretical and empirical work in political economy. Second, it develops a parallel empirical analysis that updates studies in the literature and reexamines some of the claims, in a setting unified in terms of policy outcomes and period under study. Third, it develops new directions for research, presenting some novel exploratory results.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Literature.
Volume (Year): 41 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Other versions of this item:
- Tim Besley, 2002. "Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States," IFS Working Papers W02/13, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Case, Anne, 2002. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 3498, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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89-7, Florida - College of Business Administration.
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- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
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- Crain, W Mark & Tollison, Robert D, 1977. "Attenuated Property Rights and the Market for Governors," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 205-11, April.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Which Governors Are Proposing Spending Increases and Which are Proposing Cuts?
by Matt Mitchell in Neighborhood Effects on 2011-06-03 19:02:59
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