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Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House

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Author Info
Levitt, Steven D

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Abstract

Previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending. Those studies, however, do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote-getting ability across candidates. This paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion; differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes. Estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies. Campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes, regardless of who does the spending. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 102 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 777-98
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:102:y:1994:i:4:p:777-98

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  1. Alan Gerber & Daniel Kessler & Marc Meredith, 2008. "The Persuasive Effects of Direct Mail: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," NBER Working Papers 14206, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. William A. McEachern, 2006. "AEA Ideology: Campaign Contributions of American Economic Association Members, Committee Members, Officers, Editors, Referees, Authors, and Acknowledgees," Econ Journal Watch, Atlas Economic Research Foundation, vol. 3(2), pages 148-179, May. [Downloadable!]
  3. Prat, A., 1998. "Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies," Discussion Paper 123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Stephen Coate, 2003. "Power-hungry Candidates, Policy Favors, and Pareto Improving Campaign Finance Policy," NBER Working Papers 9601, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Uppal, Yogesh, 2008. "Estimation of the Incumbency Effects in the US State Legislatures: A Quasi-Experimental Approach," MPRA Paper 8575, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. Thomas Stratmann, 2003. "Tainted Money? Contribution Limits and the Effectiveness of Campaign Spending," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  7. Philip Jones & John Hudson, 1998. "The role of political parties: An analysis based on transaction costs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 175-189, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Sunde, Uwe, 2003. "Potential, Prizes and Performance: Testing Tournament Theory with Professional Tennis Data," IZA Discussion Papers 947, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  9. Bernardo S. da Silveira & João Manoel Pinho de Mello, 2007. "Campaign Advertising and Election Outcomes: Quasi-Natural Experiment Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in Brazil," Textos para discussão 550, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil), revised Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
  10. Enrique García Viñuela & Joaquín Artés Caselles, 2008. "Reforming campaign finance in the nineties: a case study of Spain," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 177-190, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ansolabehere, Stephen & De Figueiredo, John M. & Snyder, James M., 2003. "Are Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?"," Working papers 4272-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  12. Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2007. "Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress," NBER Working Papers 13672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Filip Palda, 2002. "Campaign Finance: An Introduction to the Field," Public Economics 0209005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  14. David S. Lee, 2001. "The Electoral Advantage to Incumbency and Voters' Valuation of Politicians' Experience: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Elections to the U.S..," NBER Working Papers 8441, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Thomas Evans, 2007. "An empirical test of why incumbents adopt campaign spending limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 437-456, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. repec:bep:buspol:2:2000:1:75-88 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Christopher Magee, . "Campaign Contributions, Policy Decisions, and Election Outcomes A Study of the Effects of Campaign Finance Reform," Economics Public Policy Brief Archive 64, Levy Economics Institute, The. [Downloadable!]
  18. Jeffrey Milyo, 1998. "The Electoral Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: A Natural Experiment Approach," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9806, Department of Economics, Tufts University. [Downloadable!]
  19. Allan Drazen & Nuno Limão & Thomas Stratman, 2004. "Political Contribution Caps and Lobby Formation: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 10928, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. David M. Primo & Jeffrey D. Milyo, 2003. "Campaign Finance and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States," Working Papers 0315, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  21. Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann, 2006. "Selling Favors in the Lab: Experiments on Campaign Finance Reform," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  22. Daniel J. Benjamin & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2006. "Thin-Slice Forecasts of Gubernatorial Elections," NBER Working Papers 12660, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Christopher Magee, 2000. "Why Do Political Action Committees Give Money to Candidates? Campaign Contributions, Policy Choices, and Election Outcomes," Macroeconomics 0004038, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  24. repec:bep:buspol:2:2000:1:9-33 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. David Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, 2004. "State Campaign Finance Laws and the Turnout Decision," Working Papers 0410, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
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