Flip-Flopping: Ideological Adjustment Costs in the United States Senate
AbstractUsing a long panel of roll call voting data, I find that “flip-flopping" senators face significant electoral costs when changing positions. In models of electoral competition, as the costs to candidates changing position approach zero, the equilibrium prediction is the convergence of platforms. Such convergence is at odds with empirical observation. Using a dynamic, structural model of candidate positioning, I identify the nature of the costs associated with changing position that may result in such non-convergence.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Middle Tennessee State University, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 201403.
Date of creation: Jan 2014
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Web page: http://www.mtsu.edu/~berc/working/Economics_Working_Papers.html
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Ideology; Voting; Politics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-03-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2014-03-01 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2014-03-01 (Positive Political Economics)
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