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Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-a-vis Cost of Betrayal

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  • Yasushi Asako

    (School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University)

Abstract

This study examines and models the effects of partially binding campaign platforms in a political competition. Here, a candidate who implements a policy that differs from the platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyze endogenous decisions by citizens to run for an election. In particular, the model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had di￠ culty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, even knowing that he/she will lose an election, a candidate will still run, hoping to make an opponent?s policy approach his/her own policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Yasushi Asako, 2014. "Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-a-vis Cost of Betrayal," Working Papers 1409, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wap:wpaper:1409
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    Cited by:

    1. Akifumi Ishihara, 2020. "Strategic candidacy for political compromise in party politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 389-408, July.
    2. Yukihiro Nishimura & Kimiko Terai, 2021. "Electoral Commitment in Asymmetric Tax-competition Models," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 20-21-Rev., Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    3. Yukihiro Nishimura & Kimiko Terai, 2021. "Electoral Commitment in Asymmetric Tax-competition Models," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 20-21, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    4. Yukihiro Nishimura & Kimiko Terai, 2016. "The Direction of Strategic Delegation and Voter Welfare in Asymmetric Tax Competition Models," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 16-27, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    5. Elena Manzoni, 2020. "Extreme events, ex post renegotiation and vagueness of campaign promises," Working Papers 10/2020, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    6. Yasushi Asako, 2015. "Campaign promises as an imperfect signal: How does an extreme candidate win against a moderate candidate?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 613-649, October.
    7. Akifumi Ishihara & Shintaro Miura, 2017. "Minor candidates as kingmakers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 253-263, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political competition; endogenous candidates; campaign promises;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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