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Yasushi Asako

Personal Details

First Name:Yasushi
Middle Name:
Last Name:Asako
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pas148
http://www.yasushiasako.com/

Affiliation

School of Political Science and Economics
Faculty of Political Science and Economics
Waseda University

Tokyo, Japan
http://www.waseda.jp/fpse/pse/
RePEc:edi:spwasjp (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Yasushi Asako, 2019. "Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting," Working Papers 1906, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
  2. Yasushi Asako & Tatsushi Okuda, 2017. "Guiding the Economy Toward the Target Inflation Rate: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach," IMES Discussion Paper Series 17-E-03, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
  3. Yasushi Asako & Yukihiko Funaki & Kozo Ueda & Nobuyuki Uto, 2017. "(A)symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence," Globalization Institute Working Papers 312, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  4. Yasushi Asako & Tetsuya MatsubayashiAuthor-Name-First: TetsuyaAuthor-Name-Last: MatsubayashiAuthor-Workplace-Name: Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University & Michiko Ueda, 2016. "Legislative TermLimits and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the United States," Working Papers 1603, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
  5. Yasushi Asako, 2015. "One-sided Games in a War of Attrition," Working Papers 1420, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
  6. Yasushi Asako, 2014. "Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-a-vis Cost of Betrayal," Working Papers 1409, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
  7. Yasushi Asako, 2014. "Campaign Promises as an Imperfect Signal: How does an Extreme Candidate Win against a Moderate Candidate?," Working Papers 1411, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
  8. Yasushi Asako & Tetsuya Matsubayashi, 2014. "The Business Cycle and the Entry of Third-Party Candidates in the US State-Level Elections," Working Papers 1414, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
  9. Yasushi Asako & Takeshi Iida & Tetsuya Matsubayashi & Michiko Ueda, 2014. "Dynastic Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Japan," Working Papers 1412, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
  10. Yasushi Asako & Kozo Ueda, 2012. "The Boy Who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings Against Riding Bubbles," CARF F-Series CARF-F-282, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  11. Yasushi Asako & Tetsuya Matsubayashi & Michiko Ueda, 2012. "Seniority, Term Limits, and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the United States," IMES Discussion Paper Series 12-E-05, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
  12. Yasushi Asako, 2010. "Partially Binding Platforms: Political Promises as a Partial Commitment Device," IMES Discussion Paper Series 10-E-01, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
  13. Yasushi Asako, 2010. "Partially Binding Platforms and the Advantages of Being an Extreme Candidate," IMES Discussion Paper Series 10-E-07, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.

Articles

  1. Asako, Yasushi & Funaki, Yukihiko & Ueda, Kozo & Uto, Nobuyuki, 2020. "(A)symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
  2. Yasushi Asako, 2019. "Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 626-641, October.
  3. Yasushi ASAKO, 2019. "Seijikeizaigaku de yomitoku seifu no kōdō: Abenomikusu no riron bunseki (The Political Economy of Government’s Choices: Theoretical Analysis on Abenomics)," Social Science Japan Journal, University of Tokyo and Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 163-166.
  4. Asako Yasushi & Matsubayashi Tetsuya & Ueda Michiko, 2016. "Legislative Term Limits and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the United States," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(3), pages 1501-1538, September.
  5. Asako Yasushi, 2015. "One-Sided Games in a War of Attrition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 313-331, July.
  6. Yasushi Asako, 2015. "Campaign promises as an imperfect signal: How does an extreme candidate win against a moderate candidate?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 613-649, October.
  7. Yasushi Asako, 2015. "Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-à-vis Cost of Betrayal," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 322-353, September.
  8. Yasushi Asako & Kozo Ueda, 2014. "The Boy Who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings Against Riding Bubbles," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(3), pages 1137-1152, July.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Yasushi Asako & Yukihiko Funaki & Kozo Ueda & Nobuyuki Uto, 2017. "(A)symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence," Globalization Institute Working Papers 312, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

    Cited by:

    1. Chan, Joshua C.C. & Santi, Caterina, 2021. "Speculative bubbles in present-value models: A Bayesian Markov-switching state space approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    2. Bao, Te, 2022. "Comments on “the role of information in a continuous double auction: An experiment and learning model” by Mikhail Anufriev, Jasmina Arifovic, John Ledyard and Valentyn Panchenko," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).

  2. Yasushi Asako, 2014. "Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-a-vis Cost of Betrayal," Working Papers 1409, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Elena Manzoni, 2020. "Extreme events, ex post renegotiation and vagueness of campaign promises," Working Papers 10/2020, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    2. Akifumi Ishihara & Shintaro Miura, 2017. "Minor candidates as kingmakers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 253-263, March.
    3. Yukihiro Nishimura & Kimiko Terai, 2021. "Electoral Commitment in Asymmetric Tax-competition Models," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 20-21-Rev., Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    4. Yasushi Asako, 2014. "Campaign Promises as an Imperfect Signal: How does an Extreme Candidate Win against a Moderate Candidate?," Working Papers 1411, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    5. Akifumi Ishihara, 2020. "Strategic candidacy for political compromise in party politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(3), pages 389-408, July.
    6. Yukihiro Nishimura & Kimiko Terai, 2021. "Electoral Commitment in Asymmetric Tax-competition Models," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 20-21, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    7. Yukihiro Nishimura & Kimiko Terai, 2016. "The Direction of Strategic Delegation and Voter Welfare in Asymmetric Tax Competition Models," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 16-27, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.

  3. Yasushi Asako, 2014. "Campaign Promises as an Imperfect Signal: How does an Extreme Candidate Win against a Moderate Candidate?," Working Papers 1411, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniel L. Bennett & Christopher Boudreaux & Boris Nikolaev, 2023. "Populist discourse and entrepreneurship: The role of political ideology and institutions," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 54(1), pages 151-181, February.
    2. Yasushi Asako, 2014. "Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-a-vis Cost of Betrayal," Working Papers 1409, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.

  4. Yasushi Asako & Takeshi Iida & Tetsuya Matsubayashi & Michiko Ueda, 2014. "Dynastic Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Japan," Working Papers 1412, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Folke, Olle & Rickne, Johanna & Smith, Daniel M., 2018. "Gender and Dynastic Political Recruitment," Working Paper Series 1233, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    2. Jon H. Fiva & Daniel M. Smith, 2016. "Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environments," CESifo Working Paper Series 5757, CESifo.
    3. Mendoza, Ronald & Beja Jr, Edsel & Venida, Victor & Yap II, David, 2014. "Political dynasties and poverty: Resolving the “chicken or the egg” question," MPRA Paper 53361, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Gianmarco Daniele & Paul Vertier, 2016. "Dynasties and the Political Budget Cycle," CESifo Working Paper Series 6231, CESifo.
    5. Fernando Antonio Ignacio González & Maria Emma Santos & Juan Cruz Fernández, 2021. "¿Discontinuidades o continuidades políticas? Explorando sus efectos sobre el desempeño económico: el caso de la intervención federal en Santiago del Estero," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4480, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    6. Koichi Kagitani & Kozo Harimaya, 2020. "Constituency systems, election proximity, special interests and a free trade agreement: the case of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in Japan," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 897-922, October.
    7. Beja Jr, Edsel & Mendoza, Ronald U. & Venida, Victor S. & Yap, David B., 2012. "Inequality in democracy: Insights from an empirical analysis of political dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress," MPRA Paper 40104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Michael Batu, 2017. "Poverty and the Colonial Origins of Elite Capture: Evidence from Philippine Provinces," Working Papers 1708, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    9. Kodila-Tedika, Oasis & Khalifa, Sherif & Konso Mulali, Ben, 2020. "Who Becomes Minister in an Autocratic Regime? Evidence From DRC," MPRA Paper 103022, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  5. Yasushi Asako & Kozo Ueda, 2012. "The Boy Who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings Against Riding Bubbles," CARF F-Series CARF-F-282, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.

    Cited by:

    1. Yasushi Asako & Yukihiko Funaki & Kozo Ueda & Nobuyuki Uto, 2017. "Symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence," CAMA Working Papers 2017-05, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    2. Doblas-Madrid, Antonio, 2016. "A finite model of riding bubbles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 154-162.
    3. Feng Liu & Joseph S. White & John R. Conlon, 2023. "A Three‐State Rational Greater‐Fool Bubble Model With Intertemporal Consumption Smoothing," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1565-1594, November.
    4. Awaya, Yu & Iwasaki, Kohei & Watanabe, Makoto, 2022. "Rational bubbles and middlemen," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.

  6. Yasushi Asako, 2010. "Partially Binding Platforms: Political Promises as a Partial Commitment Device," IMES Discussion Paper Series 10-E-01, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.

    Cited by:

    1. Yasushi Asako, 2010. "Partially Binding Platforms and the Advantages of Being an Extreme Candidate," IMES Discussion Paper Series 10-E-07, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.

  7. Yasushi Asako, 2010. "Partially Binding Platforms and the Advantages of Being an Extreme Candidate," IMES Discussion Paper Series 10-E-07, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.

    Cited by:

    1. Scott Gehlbach & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2010. "Businessman Candidates," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 718-736, July.
    2. Yasushi Asako, 2010. "Partially Binding Platforms: Political Promises as a Partial Commitment Device," IMES Discussion Paper Series 10-E-01, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.

Articles

  1. Asako, Yasushi & Funaki, Yukihiko & Ueda, Kozo & Uto, Nobuyuki, 2020. "(A)symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Yasushi Asako, 2015. "Campaign promises as an imperfect signal: How does an extreme candidate win against a moderate candidate?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 613-649, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Yasushi Asako, 2015. "Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-à-vis Cost of Betrayal," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 322-353, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Yasushi Asako & Kozo Ueda, 2014. "The Boy Who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings Against Riding Bubbles," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(3), pages 1137-1152, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 15 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (7) 2010-04-11 2015-06-20 2015-07-04 2015-07-04 2015-07-18 2017-10-08 2021-02-15. Author is listed
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (6) 2015-06-20 2015-07-18 2017-01-29 2017-05-07 2017-06-11 2017-10-08. Author is listed
  3. NEP-MAC: Macroeconomics (6) 2014-01-24 2014-02-02 2017-01-29 2017-05-07 2017-06-11 2017-10-08. Author is listed
  4. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (5) 2010-04-11 2015-06-20 2015-07-04 2015-07-18 2021-02-15. Author is listed
  5. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (4) 2017-01-29 2017-05-07 2017-10-08 2019-05-27
  6. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 2015-06-20 2015-06-20 2015-07-18 2021-02-15
  7. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (2) 2017-01-29 2017-10-08
  8. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (1) 2017-05-07
  9. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2014-01-24
  10. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2017-06-11
  11. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2021-02-15

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