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Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature

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  • Thomas Stratmann

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Abstract

The financing of political campaigns is an area of active scholarly study. I review some of the recent literature and discuss important methodological issues that arise in empirical research on campaign expenditures and campaign contributions. The effects of campaign expenditures and advertising on candidate and ballot-measure elections are summarized, as are the impacts of contributions on contributors’ welfare. Many states have changed their campaign finance laws in the past few years, and I describe work that exploits variations in these laws. A discussion of the strategies used by interest groups to allocate their campaign contributions provides insights into contributors’ motives. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-005-4750-3
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 124 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 135-156

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:1:p:135-156

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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  1. Jeffrey Milyo, 1998. "What do Candidates Maximize (and Why Should Anyone Care)?," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9822, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  2. Thomas Stratmann, 1994. "How Reelection Constituencies Matter," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 97, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  3. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1996. "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress:Theory And Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 126, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  4. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
  5. Prat, A., 1997. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," Discussion Paper 1997-118, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Kau, James B & Keenan, Donald & Rubin, Paul H, 1982. "A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 271-93, May.
  7. Riezman, R. & Wilson, J.D., 1993. "Political Reform and Trade Policy," Working Papers 93-09, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  8. Jeffrey Milyo, 1998. "The Political Economics of Campaign Finance: Lessons for Reform," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9811, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  9. Christian Schultz & Ignacio Ortuno-OrtÍn, 2000. "Public Funding of Political Parties," CESifo Working Paper Series 368, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Rebecca Morton & Charles Cameron, 1992. "Elections And The Theory Of Campaign Contributions: A Survey And Critical Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 79-108, 03.
  11. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June.
  12. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph & van Winden, Frans, 1997. "Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-31, February.
  13. Djankov, Simeon & Murrell, Peter, 2002. "Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 3319, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Wittman, Donald, 2007. "Candidate quality, pressure group endorsements and the nature of political advertising," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 360-378, June.
  15. Prat, A., 1998. "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters and Multiple Lobbies," Discussion Paper 1998-123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  16. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 628-655, June.
  17. Allan Drazen & Nuno Limão & Thomas Stratman, 2004. "Political Contribution Caps and Lobby Formation: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 10928, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
  19. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
  20. Stratmann, Thomas, 1995. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 77(1), pages 127-36, February.
  21. David M. Primo & Jeffrey D. Milyo, 2003. "Campaign Finance and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States," Working Papers 0315, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
  22. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 2005. "Corporate Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(1), pages 41-71, April.
  23. Thomas Stratmann, 2009. "How prices matter in politics: the returns to campaign advertising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 357-377, September.
  24. Seema Jayachandran, 2004. "The Jeffords Effect," UCLA Economics Online Papers 297, UCLA Department of Economics.
  25. Stratmann, Thomas, 1992. "Are Contributions Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 647-64, June.
  26. Bronars, Stephen G & Lott, John R, Jr, 1997. "Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 317-50, October.
  27. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 772-804, 09.
  28. Thomas Stratmann, 2006. "Contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 461-474, December.
  29. Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1994. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," NBER Working Papers 4877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann, 2006. "Selling Favors in the Lab: Experiments on Campaign Finance Reform," CESifo Working Paper Series 1727, CESifo Group Munich.
  31. Lott, John R, Jr, 2000. "A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures Are Increasing: The Government Is Getting Bigger," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 359-93, October.
  32. Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C, 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 24-43, January.
  33. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
  34. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas S. Stratmann, 2000. "Congressional Committees as Reputation-building Mechanisms," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 3.
  35. Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. & Aparicio-Castillo, 2006. "Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 177-206, April.
  36. Stratmann, Thomas, 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-73, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Carlos D. Ramirez, 2011. "The $700 Billion Bailout: A Public-Choice Interpretation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 13.
  2. Michael Ensley, 2012. "Incumbent positioning, ideological heterogeneity and mobilization in U.S. House elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 43-61, April.
  3. Elena Panova, 2007. "Congruence Among Voters and Contributions to Political Campaigns," Cahiers de recherche 0722, CIRPEE.
  4. Ramanna, Karthik, 2008. "The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: Evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 253-281, August.
  5. Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2011. "Votes or money? Theory and evidence from the US Congress," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 587-611.
  6. Daniel Houser & Sandra Ludwig & Thomas Stratmann, 2009. "Does Deceptive Advertising Reduce Political Participation? Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 1011, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
  7. Zara Sharif & Otto H. Swank, 2012. "Do More Powerful Interest Groups have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-134/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
  8. Leopoldo Fergusson, 2012. "Media Markets, Special Interests, and Voters," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 009796, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  9. Luca Corazzini & Sebastian Kube & Michel André Maréchal & Antonio Nicolò, 2009. "Elections and deceptions: an experimental study on the behavioral effects of democracy," IEW - Working Papers 421, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, revised May 2012.
  10. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 456-481, April.
  11. Silke Friedrich, 2010. "Measuring Interest Group Activity," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(4), pages 37-46, 01.
  12. Thomas Stratmann, 2011. "Campaign Contributions – What Do They Buy and Should They be Capped?," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(1), pages 17-20, 05.
  13. Christopher Cotton, 2008. "Should We Tax or Cap Political Contributions? A Lobbying Model with Policy Favors and Access," Working Papers 0901, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  14. Chen, Hui & Parsley, David & Yang, Ya-wen, 2010. "Corporate Lobbying and Financial Performance," MPRA Paper 21114, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2010. "The Political Economy of the Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion," NBER Working Papers 16107, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Chen, Maggie, 2009. "The Matching of Heterogeneous Firms and Politicians," MPRA Paper 23508, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Philip Hersch & Jeffry Netter & Christopher Pope, 2008. "Do Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures by Firms Create “Political” Capital?," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(4), pages 395-405, December.
  18. Matthias Dahm & Robert Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2012. "How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3788, CESifo Group Munich.

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