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Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation

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Author Info
Stratmann, Thomas

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Abstract

The challenge in the campaign contribution literature has been to overcome the simultaneous-equation bias that is inherent in the vote-contribution relationship. This paper proposes a new method to overcome this bias. It examines behavior at different points of time and relates it to contributions at different points of time. This method is applied to legislators' voting decisions on financial services regulation. Analyzing this type of legislation is of particular interest because it allows an analysis of the net influence of competing interest groups. Consistent with the proposed model's predictions, I find evidence that changes in contribution levels determine changes in roll call voting behavior, that contributions from competing groups are partially offsetting, and that junior legislators are more responsive to changes in contribution levels than are senior legislators. Copyright 2002 by the University of Chicago.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 45 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 345-73
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:45:y:2002:i:2:p:345-73

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  1. Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann, 2008. "Selling favors in the lab: experiments on campaign finance reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 215-239, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler, 2008. "Corporate Campaign Contributions as a Predictor for Abnormal Stock Returns after Presidential Elections," Working Papers 2008-18, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  3. Michael Bailey, 2004. "The (Sometimes Surprising) Consequences of Societally Unrepresentative Contributors on Legislative Responsiveness," Business and Politics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(3), pages 1087-1087. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Seema Jayachandran, 2004. "The Jeffords Effect," UCLA Economics Online Papers 297, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Thomas Stratmann, 2003. "Tainted Money? Contribution Limits and the Effectiveness of Campaign Spending," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2007. "On the Determinants and Effects of Political Influence," RES Working Papers 4540, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  7. Peter T. Calcagno & John D. Jackson, . "PAC Spending and Roll Call Voting in the U.S. House: An Empirical Extension," Working Papers 4, Department of Economics and Finance, College of Charleston. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Thomas Stratmann, 2003. "Do Strict Electoral Campaign Finance Rules Limit Corruption?," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 1(1), pages 24-27, 02. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ansolabehere, Stephen & De Figueiredo, John M. & Snyder, James M., 2003. "Are Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?"," Working papers 4272-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  10. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2008. "The Political Economy of the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis," NBER Working Papers 14468, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2007. "Sobre los determinantes y efectos de la influencia de politica (On the Determinants and Effects of Political Influence)," RES Working Papers 4541, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  12. LE BRETON, Michel & ZAPOROZHETS, Vera, 2007. "Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty," IDEI Working Papers 493, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  13. Dennis Coates & Bonnie Wilson, 2007. "Interest group activity and long-run stock market performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 343-358, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Randall Bennett & Christine Loucks, 2008. "PAC Contributions from Sectors of the Financial Services Industry, 1998–2002," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(4), pages 407-419, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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