Deep Pockets, Extreme Preferences: Interest Groups and Campaign Finance Contributions
AbstractIn electoral competitions, interest groups will be willing to finance politicians that require funding for campaign advertising, in exchange for policy favors. Our model predicts that interest groups with more extreme preferences will devote more resources to campaign financing. This occurs because lobbies demand policy favors that are costly to candidates since they reduce voter consent. Extreme interest groups must therefore adequately reward politicians by providing higher contributions, so that candidates may recover popularity through campaign advertising. Our unique data set on U.S. House elections provides empirical evidence that is consistent with these findings.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 222.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2012
Date of revision: Apr 2012
Campaign Finance; Interest Groups; Elections; Extreme Preferences;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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