This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Grier, Kevin B
Munger, Michael C

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The authors model the behavior of a vote-maximizing legislator in order to predict interest group campaign contributions to incumbent politicians. They show that committee assignments and voter preferences affect the price a legislator requires to produce policies for any interest group. An econometric analysis of actual interest group contributions shows that these groups make significantly larger contributions to legislators on committees with jurisdiction over especially relevant policy issues and to incumbents with nonhostile constituencies. These results support the authors' theory; interest groups act as if committees matter in the determination of policy and voters' interests constrain interest group behavior. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 29 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 24-43
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:29:y:1991:i:1:p:24-43

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Email:
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dalton Conley & Brian J. McCabe, 2008. "Bribery or Just Desserts? Evidence on the Influence of Congressional Voting Patterns on PAC Contributions from Exogenous Variation in the Sex Mix of Legislator Offspring," NBER Working Papers 13945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. José Cruz, 2001. "An empirical application of the median voter model and of the interest group influence model to the Portuguese and Galician municipalities," ERSA conference papers ersa01p25, European Regional Science Association. [Downloadable!]
  3. Peter T. Calcagno & John D. Jackson, . "PAC Spending and Roll Call Voting in the U.S. House: An Empirical Extension," Working Papers 4, Department of Economics and Finance, College of Charleston. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Joseph McGarrity, 2006. "The committee assignment process as an optimal contracting problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 433-455, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Michael Ensley, 2009. "Individual campaign contributions and candidate ideology," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 221-238, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2003. "Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U. S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," Vienna Economics Papers 0315, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. repec:bep:buspol:2:2000:1:35-52 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Hoag, Dana & Hornbrook, Elizabeth & van Doren, Terry, 1997. "Political and Economic Factors Affecting Agricultural PAC Contribution Strategies," 1997 Annual Meeting, July 13-16, 1997, Reno\Sparks, Nevada 35888, Western Agricultural Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
  9. Glenn Parker & Suzanne Parker, 1998. "The economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 117-129, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. repec:bep:buspol:2:2000:3:289-308 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2008. "The Political Economy of the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis," NBER Working Papers 14468, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler, 2008. "Corporate Campaign Contributions as a Predictor for Abnormal Stock Returns after Presidential Elections," Working Papers 2008-18, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  14. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1999. "Does Political Ambiguity Pay? Corporate Campaign contributions and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 155, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Jay Dow & James Endersby & Charles Menifield, 1998. "The industrial structure of the California Assembly: Committee assignments, economic interests, and campaign contributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 67-83, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. repec:bep:buspol:2:2000:1:75-88 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Joseph McGarrity, 2005. "Macroeconomic conditions and committee re-election rates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 453-480, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Randall Bennett & Christine Loucks, 2008. "PAC Contributions from Sectors of the Financial Services Industry, 1998–2002," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(4), pages 407-419, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Robert Florence, 1999. "An analysis of PAC contributions and legislator quality," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 27(1), pages 59-73, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Ansolabehere, Stephen & De Figueiredo, John M. & Snyder, James M., 2003. "Are Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?"," Working papers 4272-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  21. repec:bep:buspol:4:2002:2:131-155 is not listed on IDEAS
  22. Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2007. "Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress," NBER Working Papers 13672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  23. Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. & Aparicio-Castillo, 2006. "Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 177-206, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There are NEP reports in over 80 fields that deliver new research to your email.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.