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The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?

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Author Info
Stratmann, Thomas

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Abstract

This study utilizes the timing of campaign contributions to identify whether the objective of Political Action Committees (PACs) is to influence congressional votes or solely to elect a preferred candidate. The results show that PAC behavior is consistent with an attempt to purchase congressional votes and to influence elections. Contributions increase in the weeks surrounding legislative events of importance to PACs and elections. The magnitude of increased contributions is examined. The article also addresses the lack of legal enforcement mechanisms in vote-for-contribution agreements. It develops hypotheses regarding the timing of contributions as an inexpensive mechanism to assure contractual performance. Hypotheses are tested regarding PACs' incentives to mitigate potential cheating by legislators on such agreements. Results show that PACs use the timing of contributions as a mechanism to prevent legislators from reneging on vote-for-contribution trades. Copyright 1998 by the University of Chicago.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 41 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 85-113
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:41:y:1998:i:1:p:85-113

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  1. Jeffrey Milyo & David M. Primo, 2005. "Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence From the States," Working Papers 0513, Department of Economics, University of Missouri. [Downloadable!]
  2. Seema Jayachandran, 2004. "The Jeffords Effect," UCLA Economics Online Papers 297, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. repec:bep:buspol:9:2007:2:1202-1202 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Peter T. Calcagno & John D. Jackson, . "PAC Spending and Roll Call Voting in the U.S. House: An Empirical Extension," Working Papers 4, Department of Economics and Finance, College of Charleston. [Downloadable!]
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  5. De Figueiredo, John M. & De Figueiredo, Rui J. P. Jr., 2002. "The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation," Working papers 4247-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  6. repec:bep:buspol:4:2002:2:161-181 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. & Aparicio-Castillo, 2006. "Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 177-206, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. John M. de Figueriedo, 2004. "The Timing, Intensity, and Composition of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis of Structural Policy Windows in the States," NBER Working Papers 10588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. John de Figueiredo, . "The Timing, Intensity, and Composition of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis of Structural Policy Windows in the States," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1082, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
  10. Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Christopher Magee, 1999. "Why Do Political Action Committees Give Money to Candidates? Campaign Contributions, Policy Choices, and Election Outcomes," Economics Working Paper Archive 292, Levy Economics Institute, The. [Downloadable!]
  12. repec:bep:buspol:2:2000:1:75-88 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Axel Dreher & Bernhard Boockmann, 2007. "Do Human Rights Offenders Oppose Human Rights Resolutions in the United Nations?," KOF Working papers 07-163, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
  14. Allan Drazen & Nuno Limão & Thomas Stratman, 2004. "Political Contribution Caps and Lobby Formation: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 10928, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. David M. Primo & Jeffrey D. Milyo, 2003. "Campaign Finance and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States," Working Papers 0315, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  16. Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann, 2006. "Selling Favors in the Lab: Experiments on Campaign Finance Reform," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1999. "Does Political Ambiguity Pay? Corporate Campaign contributions and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 155, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Christopher Magee, 2000. "Why Do Political Action Committees Give Money to Candidates? Campaign Contributions, Policy Choices, and Election Outcomes," Macroeconomics 0004038, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  19. David Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, 2004. "State Campaign Finance Laws and the Turnout Decision," Working Papers 0410, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
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