What do Candidates Maximize (and Why Should Anyone Care)?
AbstractMuch empirical work on Congressional elections implicitly assumes that candidates are vote-maximizers; this may be a fair assumption for challengers, but it is not a good description of incumbent behavior. I present a general intertemporal utility maximizing model of candidate behavior, which includes vote-maximization as a special case. I then demonstrate that these models have important consequences for both the design and interpretation of empirical work. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Tufts University in its series Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University with number 9822.
Date of creation: 1998
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- Milyo, Jeffrey, 2001. " What do Candidates Maximize (and Why Should Anyone Care)?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 109(1-2), pages 119-39, October.
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- Thomas Stratmann, 2009. "How prices matter in politics: the returns to campaign advertising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 357-377, September.
- Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July.
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