Do State Campaign Finance Reforms Reduce Public Corruption?
AbstractThe Supreme Court has long held that campaign finance regulations are permissible for the purpose of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. Yet the implied hypothesis that campaign finance reforms are effective tools for combating public corruption has gone essentially untested. We conduct the first systematic evaluation of the effects of campaign finance laws on actual corruption rates in the states. We examine the effects of state reforms on both convictions and filings in public corruption cases over the last 25 years; overall, we find no strong or convincing evidence that state campaign finance reforms reduce public corruption. Earlier research that employs similar methods also finds little support for the contention that state campaign finance regulations increase public trust and confidence in government. Together, these results call into question the legal rationale for campaign finance regulations.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Missouri in its series Working Papers with number 1301.
Length: 48 pgs.
Date of creation: 17 Jan 2013
Date of revision:
public corruption; campaign finance; regulation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2013-03-09 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-03-09 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2013-03-09 (Regulation)
- NEP-URE-2013-03-09 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Stratton).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.