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Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition

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Author Info
Christopher J. Ellis () (University of Oregon)
Oguzhan C. Dincer (Massey University)
Glenn R. Waddell (University of Oregon)

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Abstract

Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Using data on federal corruption-related convictions in U.S. states we propose and test a spatial autoregressive model of corruption, providing new evidence in support of the theoretical findings.

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File URL: http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2005-5_Ellis_Decentralization.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Oregon Economics Department in its series University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers with number 2005-5.

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Length: 21
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2005
Date of revision: 01 Jan 2006
Handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2005-5

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Postal: 1285 University of Oregon, 435 PLC, Eugene, OR 97403-1285
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Web page: http://economics.uoregon.edu/
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Related research
Keywords: Corruption; decentralization; yardstick competition; spatial autoregression;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
H29 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. G. Gulsun Arikan, 2004. "Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 175-195, 03. [Downloadable!]
  2. Edward L. Glaeser & Raven Saks, 2004. "Corruption in America," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2043, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Edward L. Glaeser & Raven Saks, 2004. "Corruption in America," NBER Working Papers 10821, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. " Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from U.S. Federal Transfer Programs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 25-35, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Angelino Viceisza, 2007. "An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2007-09, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, 2008. "Inequality and Corruption: Evidence from US States," EPRU Working Paper Series 08-02, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Christian Lessmann & Gunther Markwardt, 2009. "One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

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