Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition
AbstractSeveral empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Using data on federal corruption-related convictions in U.S. states we propose and test a spatial autoregressive model of corruption, providing new evidence in support of the theoretical findings.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oregon Economics Department in its series University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers with number 2005-5.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2005
Date of revision: 01 Jan 2006
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More information through EDIRC
Corruption; decentralization; yardstick competition; spatial autoregression;
Other versions of this item:
- Oguzhan Dincer & Christopher Ellis & Glen Waddell, 2010. "Corruption, decentralization and yardstick competition," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 269-294, June.
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H29 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-03-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2005-03-20 (Public Economics)
- NEP-REG-2005-03-20 (Regulation)
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