Decentralization of the Size and Scope of Local Governments and Corruption
AbstractThis research adds to the literature on the nexus between government and corruption by examining further the influence of government decentralization on corruption. Previous research has focused primarily on fiscal decentralization. We bring additional evidence to bear for the United States by addressing whether the structure of local governments – measured both in terms of the scope of services offered and the size of the population served – has a bearing on corruption within the state. Results show that government decentralization does not necessarily reduce corruption – the type of decentralization matters. Specifically, we find that more general-purpose governments consistently contribute to corruption. In contrast, the effect of special-purpose governments on corruption is mixed. The findings uniquely flush out the tension between fiscal decentralization and fragmental local government structures in terms of impacts on corruption. Beyond this, we find that the influences of various government enforcement agencies on corruption, including police, judiciary and corrections, vary. Other corruption determinants generally support the literature. Policy implications are discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series Working Papers CEB with number 10-031.
Length: 35 p.
Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Corruption; Fiscal decentralization; Local government fragmentation; Special-purpose government; General-purpose government;
Other versions of this item:
- Rajeev Goel & Michael Nelson, 2011. "Government fragmentation versus fiscal decentralization and corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 471-490, September.
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-06-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2010-06-18 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-06-18 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-URE-2010-06-18 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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