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Red tape and corruption

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Author Info
Guriev, Sergei

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBV-4B429YX-4/2/c0c235d302cd946a0b942c60444ed1ee
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 73 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 489-504
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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:73:y:2004:i:2:p:489-504

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  1. Ratbek Dzhumashev, 2007. "Corruption, Uncertainty And Growth," Monash Economics Working Papers 15/07, Monash University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Djumashev, Ratbek, 2006. "Corrupt Bureaucracy and Growth," MPRA Paper 2082, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. R. Pathak & Gurmeet Singh & Rakesh Belwal & R. Smith, 2007. "E-governance and Corruption-developments and Issues in Ethiopia," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 195-208, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Elizabeth Asiedu & James Freeman, 2008. "The Effect of Corruption on Investment Growth: Evidence from Firms in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and Transition Countries," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200802, University of Kansas, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Shah, Anwar, 2006. "Corruption and decentralized public governance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3824, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Scott Gehlbach, 2003. "Taxability, Elections, and Government Support of Business Activity," Working Papers w0030, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  7. Keith Blackburn & Rashmi Sarmah, 2006. "Red Tape, Corruption and Finance," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0639, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ratbek Dzhumashev, 2006. "Public Goods, Corruption And Growth???," Monash Economics Working Papers 15/06, Monash University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Mikhail Drugov, 2007. "Competition in Bureaucracy and Corruption," Economics Series Working Papers 369, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Keith Blackburn & Niloy Bosey & Salvatore Capasso, 2008. "Living With Corruption: Threshold Effects in Red Tape and Rent Seeking," Working Papers 4_2008, D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy. [Downloadable!]
  11. Dzhumashev, Ratbek, 2008. "Corruption and regulatory burden," MPRA Paper 2081, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  12. Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Keith Blackburn & Rashmi Sarmah, 2006. "Red Tape, Corruption and Finance," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 82, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
  14. Hongbin Li & Lingsheng Meng & Junsen Zhang, 2005. "Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Politics?," Discussion Papers 00009, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Djumashev, R, 2007. "Corruption, uncertainty and growth," MPRA Paper 3716, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  16. Scott Gehlbach, 2003. "Taxability and Low-Productivity Traps," Working Papers w0029, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  17. Osipian, Ararat, 2008. "The World is Flat: Modeling Educators’ Misconduct with Cellular Automata," MPRA Paper 7592, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  18. Djankov, Simeon, 2008. "The Regulation of Entry: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 7080, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Cagla Okten Hasker & Kevin Hasker, 2005. "Intermediaries and Corruption," Departmental Working Papers 0514, Bilkent University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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