Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Competition in Bureaucracy and Corruption

Contents:

Author Info

  • Mikhail Drugov
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper studies the consequences of introducing competition between bureaucrats. Bureaucrats are supposed to grant licences to firms that satisfy certain requirements. Firms have to invest into satisfying these requirements. Some bureaucrats are corrupt, that is, they give the licence to any firm in exchange for a bribe. Some firms prefer to buy the licence rather than to invest and satisfy the requirements imposing negative externalities on the society. The competition regime is found to create more ex ante incentives for firms to invest while the monopoly regime is better at implementing ex post allocation, that is, distributing the licences given the firms` investment decisions. Additional results on the effects of intermediaries, staff rotation, punishments and endogenous entry to the bureaucracy are provided.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper369.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 369.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 01 Nov 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:369

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Corruption; Competition; Bureaucracy;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1997. "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) 97-06, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    2. Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
    3. Guriev, Sergei, 2003. "Red Tape and Corruption," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3972, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-23, October.
    5. Saha, Bibhas, 2001. "Red tape, incentive bribe and the provision of subsidy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 113-133, June.
    6. Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332, November.
    7. Cadot, Olivier, 1987. "Corruption as a gamble," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 223-244, July.
    8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 1999. "Competition and corruption in an agency relationship," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 271-295, December.
    9. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
    10. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    11. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-59, January.
    12. Banerjee, A.V., 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 97-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:369. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.