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Inequality, Corruption, and Competition in the Presence of Market Imperfections Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Dutta, Indranil
Mishra, Ajit
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Paper provided by World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) in its series Working Papers with number
RP2005/46.
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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 2005Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:rp2005-46Contact details of provider: Postal: Katajanokanlaituri 6B, 00160 Helsinki Phone: +358-9-6159911 Fax: +358-9-61599333 Email: Web page: http://www.wider.unu.edu/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: corruption ; competition ; credit market ; inequality ; screening ; Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1998.
"Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1381-1403, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1996.
"Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach ,"
DELTA Working Papers
96-12, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1996.
"Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach ,"
Working papers
96-5, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1996.
"Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1494, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, 1999.
"Rents, Competition, and Corruption ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Basu, Kaushik & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Mishra, Ajit, 1992.
"Notes on bribery and the control of corruption ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 349-359, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Pranab Bardhan, 1997.
"Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues ,"
Journal of Economic Literature ,
American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mauro, Paolo, 1995.
"Corruption and Growth ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 1999.
"Competition and corruption in an agency relationship ,"
Journal of Development Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 271-295, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stephane Straub, 2005.
"Corruption and Product Market Competition ,"
ESE Discussion Papers
131, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
[Downloadable!]
Glaeser, Edward & Scheinkman, Jose & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003.
"The injustice of inequality ,"
Journal of Monetary Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 199-222, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Quy-Toan Do, 2004.
"Institutional trap ,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
3291, The World Bank.
[Downloadable!]
Banerjee, A.V., 1997.
"A Theory of Misgovernance ,"
Working papers
97-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997.
"Does Competition Kill Corruption? ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-23, October.
Bester, Helmut, 1985.
"Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-55, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1997.
"A Theory of Misgovernance ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332, November.
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