In many countries, the operation of legal, political and regulatory institutions is subverted by the wealthy and the politically powerful for their own benefit. This subversion takes the form of corruption, intimidation, and other forms of influence. We present a model of such institutional subversion focusing specifically on courts and of the effects of inequality in economic and political resources on the magnitude of subversion. We then use the model to analyze the consequences of institutional subversion for the law and order environment in the country, as well as for capital accumulation and growth. We illustrate the model with historical evidence from Gilded Age United States and the transition economies of the 1990s. We also present some cross-country evidence consistent with the basic prediction of the model.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
9150.
Length: Date of creation: Sep 2002 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9150
Note: EFG LE Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A. Phone: 617-868-3900 Email: Web page: http://www.nber.org More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2002.
"The Curley Effect,"
NBER Working Papers
8942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 2002.
"Courts: the Lex Mundi Project,"
NBER Working Papers
8890, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Benabou, R., 1996.
"Inequality and Growth,"
Working Papers
96-22, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!]
Roland Bénabou, 1996.
"Inequality and Growth,"
NBER Chapters,
in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1996, Volume 11, pages 11-92
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]
Benabou, R., 1996.
"Unequal Societies,"
Working Papers
96-17, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.) This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.