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Can Corruption Be Studied in the Lab? Comparing a Field and a Lab Experiment

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  • Olivier Armantier

    ()

  • Amadou Boly

Abstract

This paper makes an attempt at testing the external validity of corruption experiments by moving from the lab in a developed country, to where it matters the most, the field in a developing country. In our experiment a candidate proposes a bribe to a grader in order to obtain a better grade. We find the direction and the magnitude of most treatment effects to be statistically indistinguishable between the lab and the field. In particular, increasing the graders’.wage reduces in both environments the probability to accept the bribe. Finally, we identify several micro-determinants of corruption (age, religiousness, ability). Le présent article essaie de tester la validité externe des expériences sur la corruption en quittant le laboratoire dans un pays développé pour le terrain dans un pays en développement, où la corruption importe encore plus. Dans notre expérience, un candidat offre un pot-de-vin à un correcteur afin d’obtenir une meilleure note. Nous trouvons que la direction et la magnitude de la plupart des effets de traitement sont statistiquement indistinctibles entre le laboratoire et le terrain. En particulier, augmenter la rémunération des correcteurs réduit la probabilité d’accepter le pot-de-vin aussi bien en laboratoire que sur le terrain. Enfin, nous identifions plusieurs micro-déterminants de la corruption (âge, religiosité, habilité).

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2008s-26.

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Date of creation: 01 Sep 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2008s-26

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Keywords: corruption; experimental economics; field experiments.; corruption; économie expérimentale; expérience sur le terrain.;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Marco Castillo & Ragan Petrie & Maximo Torero & Angelino Viceisza, 2014. "Lost In The Mail: A Field Experiment On Crime," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 285-303, 01.
  2. Bobkova, Nina & Egbert, Henrik, 2012. "Corruption investigated in the lab: a survey of the experimental literature," MPRA Paper 38163, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Roel van Veldhuizen, 2012. "The Influence of Wages on Public Officials' Corruptibility: A Laboratory Investigation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-038/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. van Veldhuizen, Roel, 2013. "The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: A laboratory investigation," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-210, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  5. Amadou Boly, 2011. "On the incentive effects of monitoring: evidence from the lab and the field," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 241-253, May.
  6. repec:dgr:uvatin:2012038 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Bj�rn Frank & Johann Graf Lambsdorff & Fr�d�ric Boehm, 2011. "Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(1), pages 59-71, February.

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