This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Public Expenditures, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Development Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Keith Blackburn
Niloy Bose
M. Emranul Haque
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of public sector corruption and economic growth. In an economy with government intervention and capital accumulation, state-appointed bureaucrats are charged with the responsibility for procuring public goods which contribute to productive efficiency. Corruption arises because of an opportunity for bureaucrats to appropriate public funds by misinforming the government about the cost and quality of public goods provision. The incentive for each bureaucrat to do this depends on economy-wide outcomes which, in turn, depend on the behaviour of all bureaucrats. We establish the existence of multiple development regimes, together with the possibility of multiple, frequency-dependent equilibria. The predictions of our analysis accord strongly with recent empirical evidence on the causes and consequences of corruption in public office.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis in its series CDMA Conference Paper Series with number
0407.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2004Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:san:cdmacp:0407Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL Phone: 01334 462420 Fax: 01334 462444 Email: Web page: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/cdma More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Jinyu Chen).
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
Paper K Blackburn & N Bose & M E Haque, 2005.
"Public Expenditures, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Development ,"
Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series
53, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
[Downloadable!] Keith Blackburn & Niloy Bose & M. Emranul Haque, 2005.
"Public Expenditures, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Development ,"
The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
0530, Economics, The University of Manchester.
[Downloadable!] This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Romer, Paul M, 1986.
"Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(5), pages 1002-37, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cadot, Olivier, 1987.
"Corruption as a gamble ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 223-244, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, 1999.
"Rents, Competition, and Corruption ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paolo Mauro, 1996.
"The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure ,"
IMF Working Papers
96/98, International Monetary Fund.
Pranab Bardhan, 1997.
"Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues ,"
Journal of Economic Literature ,
American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jain, Arvind K, 2001.
" Corruption: A Review ,"
Journal of Economic Surveys ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(1), pages 71-121, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hamid Reza Davoodi & Sanjeev Gupta & Erwin Tiongson, 2000.
"Corruption and the Provision of Health Care and Education Services ,"
IMF Working Papers
00/116, International Monetary Fund.
Swamy, Anand & Knack, Stephen & Lee, Young & Azfar, Omar, 2001.
"Gender and corruption ,"
Journal of Development Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 25-55, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Daron Acemoglu & Thierry Verdier, 2000.
"The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 194-211, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Mauro, Paolo, 1995.
"Corruption and Growth ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1996.
"Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach ,"
Working papers
96-5, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Other versions:
Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1996.
"Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach ,"
DELTA Working Papers
96-12, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1996.
"Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1494, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1998.
"Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1381-1403, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen, 1997.
"Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of Institutional Explanation ,"
Economic Inquiry ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 590-602, July.
Andvig, Jens Chr. & Moene, Karl Ove, 1990.
"How corruption may corrupt ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 63-76, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Sarte, Pierre-Daniel G., 2000.
"Informality and rent-seeking bureaucracies in a model of long-run growth ,"
Journal of Monetary Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 173-197, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, 1997.
"The New Economics of Corruption: a Survey and Some New Results ,"
Political Studies ,
Political Studies Association, vol. 45(3), pages 496-515.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sachs, Jeffrey D & Warner, Andrew M, 1997.
"Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies ,"
Journal of African Economies ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 335-76, October.
Banerjee, A.V., 1997.
"A Theory of Misgovernance ,"
Working papers
97-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Barro, Robert J, 1990.
"Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages S103-26, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Susanto Basu & David D. Li, 1998.
"Corruption in Transition ,"
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series
161, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School.
[Downloadable!]
Isaac Ehrlich & Francis T. Lui, 1999.
"Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages S270-S293, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Shang-Jin Wei, 2000.
"How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors? ,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics ,
MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 1-11, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993.
"Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-41, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sah, R.K., 1988.
"Persistence And Pervasiveness Of Corruption: New Perspectives ,"
Papers
560, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
Oechslin, Manuel & Reto Foellmi, 2003.
"Who Gains from Non-Collusive Corruption? ,"
Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003
159, Royal Economic Society.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Reto Foellmi & Manuel Oechslin, .
"Who Gains From Non-Collusive Corruption? ,"
IEW - Working Papers
iewwp142, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW.
[Downloadable!] Foellmi, Reto & Oechslin, Manuel, 2007.
"Who gains from non-collusive corruption? ,"
Journal of Development Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 95-119, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Rivera-Batiz, Francisco L, 2001.
"International Financial Liberalization, Corruption, and Economic Growth ,"
Review of International Economics ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(4), pages 727-37, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rauch, James E. & Evans, Peter B., 2000.
"Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 49-71, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Treisman, Daniel, 2000.
"The causes of corruption: a cross-national study ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1997.
"A Theory of Misgovernance ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332, November.
Tirole, Jean, 1996.
"A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality) ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Tirole, Jean, 1994.
""A Theory of Collective Reputations" with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality ,"
IDEI Working Papers
38, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
Tirole, J., 1993.
"A Theory of Collective Reputations with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality ,"
Working papers
93-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Sah, Raaj K, 1991.
"Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(6), pages 1272-95, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1975.
"The economics of corruption ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 187-203, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Djumashev, Ratbek, 2006.
"Corrupt Bureaucracy and Growth ,"
MPRA Paper
2082, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Shankha Chakraborty & Era Dabla-Norris, 2009.
"The Quality of Public Investment ,"
IMF Working Papers
09/154, International Monetary Fund.
[Downloadable!]
M. Emranul Haque & Richard Kneller, 2007.
"Business Cycle Synchronization of the Euro Area with the New and Negotiating Member Countries ,"
Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series
92, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
[Downloadable!]
Torrisi, Gianpiero, 2009.
"Public infrastructure: definition, classification and measurement issues ,"
MPRA Paper
12990, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? LogEc provides statistical analysis about downloads from this service (and others).
This page was last updated on 2009-11-9.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .