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Distribution and development in a model of misgovernance

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  • Blackburn, Keith
  • Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F.

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality and a negative relationship between corruption and development.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 51 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 (August)
Pages: 1534-1563

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:51:y:2007:i:6:p:1534-1563

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Keith Blackburn & Rashmi Sarmah, 2006. "Red Tape, Corruption and Finance," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0639, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  2. Keith Blackburn & Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio, 2011. "Foreign aid - a fillip for development or a fuel for corruption?," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 158, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
  3. Adnan Haider & Musleh ud Din & Ejaz Ghani, 2011. "Consequences of Political Instability, Governance and Bureaucratic Corruption on Inflation and Growth: The Case of Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 50(4), pages 773-807.
  4. Keith Blackburn & Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio, 2008. "Financial Liberalisation, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Development," Development Research Working Paper Series 06/2008, Institute for Advanced Development Studies.
  5. Shuanglin Lin & Wei Zhang, 2009. "The effect of corruption on capital accumulation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(1), pages 67-93, May.
  6. Anastasia Litina & Theodore Palivos, 2011. "Explicating Corruption and Tax Evasion:Reflections on Greek Tragedy," Discussion Paper Series 2011_07, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised May 2011.
  7. Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio & Ibrahim M. Okumu, 2012. " Does Size Matter? Scale, Corruption and Uncertainty," CDMA Working Paper Series 1207, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis.
  8. Keith Blackburn & Kyriakos C. Neanidis & M. Emranul Haque, 2008. "Comparing Seasonal Forecasts of Industrial Production," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 103, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
  9. Berardi, Michele, 2011. "Fundamentalists vs. chartists: Learning and predictor choice dynamics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 776-792, May.
  10. Keith Blackburn & Rashmi Sarmah, 2008. "Corruption, development and demography," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 341-362, October.
  11. Blackburn, Keith & Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F., 2009. "Why is corruption less harmful in some countries than in others?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 797-810, December.
  12. Katherina Popkova, 2011. "Can the exchange rate regime influence corruption?," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 148-11, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
  13. Keith Blackburn & Rashmi Sarmah, 2006. "Red Tape, Corruption and Finance," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 82, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
  14. Dai, Meixing & Sidiropoulos, Moïse & Spyromitros, Eleftherios, 2010. "Fiscal policy, institutional quality and central bank transparency," MPRA Paper 23766, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Keith Blackburn & Kyriakos C. Neanidis & M. Emranul Haque, 2008. "Corruption, Seigniorage and Growth: Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 2354, CESifo Group Munich.

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