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Distribution and development in a model of misgovernance

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  • Blackburn, Keith
  • Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F.

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruption and development. --

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 51 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 (August)
Pages: 1534-1563

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:51:y:2007:i:6:p:1534-1563

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Keith Blackburn & Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio, 2007. "Why is Corruption Less Harmful in Some Countries Than in Others?," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 88, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
  2. Keith Blackburn & Rashmi Sarmah, 2008. "Corruption, development and demography," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 341-362, October.
  3. Keith Blackburn & Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio, 2011. "Foreign Aid – A Fillip for Development or a Fuel for Corruption?," Development Research Working Paper Series 09/2011, Institute for Advanced Development Studies.
  4. Haider, Adnan & Din, Musleh ud & Ghani, Ejaz, 2011. "Consequences of Political Instability, Governance and Bureaucratic Corruption on Inflation and Growth: The Case of Pakistan," MPRA Paper 35584, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Keith Blackburn & Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio, 2008. "Financial Liberalisation, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Development," Development Research Working Paper Series 06/2008, Institute for Advanced Development Studies.
  6. Anastasia Litina & Theodore Palivos, 2011. "Explicating Corruption and Tax Evasion:Reflections on Greek Tragedy," Discussion Paper Series 2011_07, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised May 2011.
  7. Shuanglin Lin & Wei Zhang, 2009. "The effect of corruption on capital accumulation," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 97(1), pages 67-93, May.
  8. Dimitrios Varvarigos, 2013. "Economic Growth, Health, and the Choice of Polluting Technologies: The Role of Bureaucratic Corruption," Discussion Papers in Economics 13/22, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
  9. Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio & Ibrahim M. Okumu, 2012. "Does Size Matter? Scale, Corruption and Uncertainty," CDMA Working Paper Series, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis 201207, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis.
  10. Keith Blackburn & Rashmi Sarmah, 2006. "Red Tape, Corruption and Finance," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 82, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
  11. Keith Blackburn & Rashmi Sarmah, 2006. "Red Tape, Corruption and Finance," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Economics, The University of Manchester 0639, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  12. Dzhumashev, Ratbek, 2014. "Corruption and growth: The role of governance, public spending, and economic development," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 202-215.
  13. Dobson, Stephen & Ramlogan-Dobson, Carlyn, 2012. "Why is Corruption Less Harmful to Income Inequality in Latin America?," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 1534-1545.

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