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Corruption Clubs: Endogenous Thresholds in Corruption and Development Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics M. Emranul Haque
Richard Kneller
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Paper provided by Economics, The University of Manchester in its series The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series with number
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