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More Order without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures

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Author Info
Huang, Peter H
Wu, Ho-Mou
Abstract

This article applies psychological game theory to study the maintenance of social order. It models the control of corruption in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. The models possess multiple equilibria, which correspond to certain social norms and organizational cultures or their absence. The models demonstrate how expectations concerning the likelihood of corrupt behavior can influence decisions to engage in such behavior via the magnitude of endogenous remorse on the part of the actor. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 10 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 390-406
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:390-406

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  2. Martin Dufwenberg & Werner Gueth, 2001. "The Psychological Game of Trust," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-19, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  3. Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2008. "The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Play," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse15_2008, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Breuer, Janice Boucher & McDermott, John, 2009. "Trustworthiness and economic performance," MPRA Paper 16777, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Luca Corazzini, Sebastian Kube, Michel André Maréchal, 2007. "Towards a Behavioral Public Choice: Guilt-Aversion and Accountability in the Lab," ISLA Working Papers 27, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  6. Paolo Mauro, 2004. "The Persistence of Corruption and Slow Economic Growth," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 51(1), pages 1. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, . "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding," IEW - Working Papers iewwp052, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  8. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Working Papers 287, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Been-Lon Chen, 2003. "Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 381-403, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Juin-jen Chang & Chia-ying Liu, 2007. "The Negligence Rule in the Presence of Judicial Corruption and Social Norms," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 35(2), pages 203-215, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006. "Promises & Partnership," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 07-06, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "Implicit Contracts: Two Different Approaches," Discussion Papers 110, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  13. M E Haque & R Kneller, 2005. "Corruption Clubs: Endogenous Thresholds in Corruption and Development," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 67, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Harvey James, 2002. "On the Reliability of Trusting," Microeconomics 0202002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. M. Emranul Haque & Richard Kneller, 2007. "Business Cycle Synchronization of the Euro Area with the New and Negotiating Member Countries," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 92, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
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