Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms
AbstractThe author exploits a unique data set on corruption containing information about estimated bribe payments by Ugandan firms. To guide the empirical analysis, he develops a simple rent-extortion model, which yields predictions on both the incidence of bribery, and the amount paid. Both predictions are consistent with the data. Firms typically have to pay bribes when dealing with public officials whose actions directly affect the firms'business operations. And the amount paid in bribes is not a fixed sum for a set of public services, but depends on the firm's ability to pay. Controlling for other potential explanations of the relationship between"ability to pay"and equilibrium graft, the author shows that the more a firm can pay, the more it has to pay.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 2486.
Date of creation: 30 Nov 2000
Date of revision:
Economic Theory&Research; Corruption&Anitcorruption Law; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; Environmental Economics&Policies; Social Policy;
Other versions of this item:
- Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes And How Much? Evidence From A Cross Section Of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230, February.
- Svensson, Jakob, 2002. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms," Seminar Papers 713, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
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