Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement
AbstractThis article analyzes corruption of law enforcement agents: payment of bribes to agents so that they will not report violations. Corruption dilutes deterrence because bribe payments are less than sanctions. The state may not be able to offset this effect of bribery by raising sanctions for the underlying offense. Thus, it may be optimal to expend resources to detect and penalize corruption. At the optimum, however, corruption may not be deterred. Nonetheless, it may be desirable to attempt to control corruption in order to raise the offender's costs -- the sum of the bribe payment and the expected sanction for bribery -- and thereby increase deterrence of the underlying violation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 6945.
Date of creation: Feb 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell. "Corruption And Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, 2001, v81(1,Jul), 1-24.
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- NEP-ALL-1999-02-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1999-02-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-1999-02-15 (Microeconomics)
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