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Corruption and Openness

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  • Zvika Neeman

    ()

  • M. Daniele Paserman

    ()

  • Avi Simhon

    ()

Abstract

We report an intriguing empirical observation. The relationship between corruption and output depends on the economy’s degree of openness: in open economies, corruption and GNP per capita are strongly negatively correlated; but in closed economies, there is no relationship at all. This stylized fact is robust to a variety of different empirical specifications. In particular, the same basic pattern persists if we use alternative measures of openness, if we focus on different time periods, if we restrict the sample to include only highly corrupt countries, if we restrict attention to specific geographic areas or to poor countries, and if we allow for the possible endogeneity of both the corruption and openness measures. We find that the extent to which corruption affects output is determined primarily by the degree of financial openness. The difference between closed and open economies is mainly due to the different effect of corruption on capital accumulation. We present a model, consistent with these findings, in which the main channel through which corruption affects output is capital drain.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp353.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp353

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Keywords: corruption; growth; openness;

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References

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Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. The cost of corruption
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2008-12-09 15:02:00
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Cited by:
  1. Wang, Yuanyuan & You, Jing, 2012. "Corruption and firm growth: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 415-433.
  2. Fabrizio Carmignani, 2007. "Efficiency of Institutions, Political Stability and Income Dynamics," The IUP Journal of Managerial Economics, IUP Publications, vol. 0(1), pages 6-30, February.
  3. Keith Blackburn & Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio, 2005. "Financial Liberalisation, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Devlopment," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0531, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  4. Sambit Bhattacharyya & Steve Dowrick & Jane Golley, 2009. "Institutions and Trade: Competitors or Complements in Economic Development?," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 85(270), pages 318-330, 09.
  5. Axel Dreher & Christos Kotsogiannis & Steve McCorriston, 2007. "Corruption Around the World: Evidence from a Structural Model," Discussion Papers 0702, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  6. Aida Isabel Tavares, 2004. "The socio-cultural and political-economic causes of corruption: a cross-country analysis," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 19, Departamento de Economia, Gestão e Engenharia Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro.
  7. Keith Blackburn & Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio, 2007. "Why is Corruption Less Harmful in Some Countries Than in Others?," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 88, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
  8. Andrew van Hulten & Michael Webber, 2010. "Do developing countries need 'good' institutions and policies and deep financial markets to benefit from capital account liberalization?," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 283-319, March.
  9. Felipe Larraín & José Tavares, 2004. "Does Foreign Direct Investment Decrease Corruption?," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 41(123), pages 217-230.
  10. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Suryadipta Roy, 2011. "Political economy determinants of non-agricultural trade policy," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 89-104.
  11. Biru Paksha Paul, 2010. "Does corruption foster growth in Bangladesh?," International Journal of Development Issues, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 9(3), pages 246-262, July.
  12. Philip Shaw & Marina‐Selini Katsaiti & Marius Jurgilas, 2011. "Corruption And Growth Under Weak Identification," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(1), pages 264-275, 01.
  13. Francisco De Assis Oliveira Campos & Luiz Ivan De Melo Castelar, 2014. "Avaliação Da Corrupção Municipal A Partir De Microdados," Anais do XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 41th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 075, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  14. George Economides & Sarantis Kalyvitis & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2008. "Does foreign aid distort incentives and hurt growth? Theory and evidence from 75 aid-recipient countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 463-488, March.

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