Following recent cross-country empirical work, research on public policy and growth has come to examine the impact of inefficient or corrupt bureaucracies. Most of this work has emphasized the interactions of bureaucracies with private markets. By contrast, this paper focuses on the relationship between rent-seeking bureaucracies and their political authority. We show that when oversight is relatively costly, as in many developing economies, the political authority exercises little monitoring of its agencies which reduces the effectiveness of productive government spending. Moreover, when the technology used to provide public services is poor, bureaus better succeed in requesting overly large budgets before triggering any monitoring. Both of these characteristics contribute to reducing the growth rate of already poor economies.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its series Working Paper with number
98-03.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993.
"Corruption,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pages 599-617, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1993.
"Corruption,"
NBER Working Papers
4372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Neeman, Zvika & Paserman, Daniele & Simhon, Avi, 2003.
"Corruption And Openness,"
Discussion Papers
14977, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Agricultural Economics and Management.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Zvika Neeman & M. Daniele Paserman & Avi Simhon, 2004.
"Corruption and Openness,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp353, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
[Downloadable!]