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Institutionalized social technologies index: A global perspective

Author

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  • Danish Ahmed SIDDIQUI

    (University of Karachi, Pakistan)

  • Qazi Masood AHMED

    (Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, Pakistan)

Abstract

This paper presents an index of institutionalized social technologies covering its two main dimensions namely Risk reducing technologies and Anti Rent seeking technologies and in turn covers several social, institutional, political and economic aspects. Specifically it attempted to classify and measure various types of institutions based on a theoretical framework, these institutional indicators are then aggregated to measure cross country institutional qualities of 141 countries. We also test provide a comparison with other major indices.

Suggested Citation

  • Danish Ahmed SIDDIQUI & Qazi Masood AHMED, 2018. "Institutionalized social technologies index: A global perspective," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(4(617), W), pages 67-96, Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:agr:journl:v:4(617):y:2018:i:4(617):p:67-96
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    Cited by:

    1. Danish Ahmed SIDDIQUI & Qazi Masood AHMED, 2020. "Institutions and economic growth: A comparative analysis of developing and developed countries based on institutionalized social technologies index," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(4(625), W), pages 309-322, Winter.
    2. Siddiqui, Danish Ahmed & Ahmed, Qazi Masood, 2009. "Institutions and Economic Growth: A Cross country Evidence," MPRA Paper 19747, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    institutions; factor analysis; index; rent seeking; governance.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
    • C43 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Index Numbers and Aggregation
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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