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Destructive Creativity

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  • Halvor Mehlum
  • Kalle Moene
  • Ragnar Torvik

Abstract

Destructive creativity implies that parasites become more efficient in rent extraction. We focus on destructive creativity in situations where parasites live on rents extracted from the producers. A higher parasitic strength implies that the waste associated with rent seeking increases, and in the long run erodes business productivity, implying that the sustainability of predation is threatened by improved efficiency.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Nordic Journal of Political Economy in its journal Nordic Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 29 (2003)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 77-84

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Handle: RePEc:noj:journl:v:29:y:2003:p:77-84

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References

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  1. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "Institutions and the Resource Curse," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 1-20, 01.
  2. Baland, Jean-Marie & Francois, Patrick, 2000. "Rent-seeking and resource booms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 527-542, April.
  3. Herschel I. Grossman, 1998. "Producers and Predators," Working Papers 98-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  4. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-27, August.
  5. Daron Acemoglu, 1993. "Reward Structures and the Allocation of Talent," CEP Discussion Papers dp0143, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  6. Baumol, William J, 1990. "Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 893-921, October.
  7. Mehlum,H. & Moene,K. & Torvik,R., 2000. "Predator or prey? : parasitic enterprises in economic development," Memorandum 27/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  8. Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
  9. Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Marcus Dejardin, 2011. "Entrepreneurship and Rent-Seeking Behavior," Post-Print halshs-00616302, HAL.
  2. Siddiqui, Danish Ahmed & Ahmed, Qazi Masood, 2009. "Does Institutions effect growth in Pakistan? An Empirical investigation," MPRA Paper 19744, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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