Entrepreneurship and Rent-Seeking Behavior
AbstractIn this chapter, we propose a primer of the treatment that has received in the economic literature the problematic of entrepreneurship and rent-seeking behavior. It comprises the introduction of employed concepts, the discussion of the allocation of entrepreneurs between different types of economic projects, namely between innovative entrepreneurship and rent-seeking, as well as the explicative factors of the allocation. Interactions between entrepreneurship, rent-seeking and growth are considered (also for a reference situation departing from the first best). Some policy implications are finally briefly evoked.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00616302.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Handbook of Research on Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Edward Elgar (Ed.), 2011, 17-23
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00616302/en/
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
entrepreneurship; rent-seeking; economic development;
Other versions of this item:
- L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Andrei A. Levchenko & QuÃƒÂ½ ToÃƒ n Ãƒo, 2006.
"Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy of Institutions,"
IMF Working Papers
06/56, International Monetary Fund.
- Do, Quy-Toan & Levchenko, Andrei A., 2009. "Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1489-1520, July.
- Do, Quy-Toan & Levchenko, Andrei A., 2006. "Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3836, The World Bank.
- Halvor Mehlum & Kalle Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2003. "Destructive Creativity," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 29, pages 77-84.
- Gradstein, Mark, 2002. "Governance and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 3270, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2004.
"Institutions and the Resource Curse,"
DEGIT Conference Papers
c009_012, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Institutions and the resource curse," Development and Comp Systems 0210003, EconWPA.
- Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar, 2003. "Institutions and the resource curse," Memorandum 29/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Institutions and the resource curse," GE, Growth, Math methods, EconWPA 0210004, EconWPA.
- Douhan, Robin & Henrekson, Magnus, 2007. "The Political Economy of Entrepreneurship: An Introduction," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 688, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl & Torvik, Ragnar, 2003.
"Predator or prey?: Parasitic enterprises in economic development,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 275-294, April.
- Mehlum,H. & Moene,K. & Torvik,R., 2000. "Predator or prey? : parasitic enterprises in economic development," Memorandum 27/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Azam Chaudhry & Phillip Garner, 2007. "Do Governments Suppress Growth? Institutions, Rent-Seeking, And Innovation Blocking In A Model Of Schumpeterian Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 35-52, 03.
- Perroni, Carlo & Proto, Eugenio, 2010. "Entrepreneurial drain under moral hazard: A high-yield sector curse?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 63-70, September.
- Baland, Jean-Marie & Francois, Patrick, 2000. "Rent-seeking and resource booms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 527-542, April.
- Douhan, Robin & Henrekson, Magnus, 2008. "Productive and Destructive Entrepreneurship in a Political Economy Framework," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 761, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Aghion, Philippe & Howitt, Peter, 1992. "A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction," Scholarly Articles 12490578, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
- Mohtadi, Hamid & Roe, Terry L., 2001.
"Democracy, Rent Seeking, Public Spending And Growth,"
Bulletins, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center
12981, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Mohtadi, Hamid & Roe, Terry L., 2003. "Democracy, rent seeking, public spending and growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 445-466, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.