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The New Comparative Economics

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  • Simeon Djankov
  • Edward L. Glaeser
  • Rafael La Porta
  • Florencio Lopez-de-Silane
  • Andrei Shleifer

Abstract

In recent years, comparative economics experienced a revival, with a new focus on comparing capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on economic development. We argue that, to understand capitalist institutions, one needs to understand the basic tradeoff between the costs of disorder and those of dictatorship. We then apply this logic to study the structure of efficient institutions, the consequences of colonial transplantation, and the politics of institutional choice.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 9608.

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Date of creation: Apr 2003
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Publication status: published as Djankov, Simeon, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer. "The New Comparative Economics," Journal of Comparative Economics, 2003, v31(4,Dec), 595-619.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9608

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