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What Works in Securities Law?

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  • Rafael La Porta
  • Florencio Lopez-de-Silane
  • Andrei Shleifer

Abstract

We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find almost no evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, and strong evidence that laws facilitating private enforcement through disclosure and liability rules benefit stock markets.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w9882.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 9882.

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Date of creation: Aug 2003
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Publication status: published as Rafael Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "What Works in Securities Laws?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 1-32, 02.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9882

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  1. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1768, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    • Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," NBER Working Papers 5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, . "Law and Finance," Working Paper 19451, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    • La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1998. "Law and Finance," Scholarly Articles 3451310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001. "Government Ownership of Banks," Working Paper Series, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government rwp01-016, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  3. William A. Reese, Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, 2001. "Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings," NBER Working Papers 8164, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1934, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Grossman, S J & Hart, O D, 1980. " Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 35(2), pages 323-34, May.
  6. Hay, Jonathan R & Shleifer, Andrei, 1998. "Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 398-403, May.
  7. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. " Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-50, July.
  8. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "A Reason for Quantity Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 431-435, May.
  9. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
  10. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1988. "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 175-202, January.
  11. Spiller, Pablo T & Ferejohn, John, 1992. "The Economics and Politics of Administrative Law and Procedures: An Introduction," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1-17, March.
  12. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, . "The Quality of Government," Working Paper 19452, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  13. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1840, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  14. Rafael La porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2002. "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1147-1170, 06.
  15. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Legal Origins," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1920, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  16. Edward Glaeser & Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Coase Versus The Coasians," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 853-899, August.
  17. Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenson, 2000. "Investor Protection and Equity Markets," NBER Working Papers 7974, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, 2002. "Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE 442, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  19. Rene M. Stulz, 1999. "Globalization of Equity Markets and the Cost of Capital," NBER Working Papers 7021, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Leuz, Christian & Nanda, Dhananjay & Wysocki, Peter D., 2003. "Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 505-527, September.
  21. Katharina Pistor & Cheng-Gang Xu, 2002. "Law enforcement under incomplete law: theory and evidence from financial market regulation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 3748, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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