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Legal Institutions and Financial Development

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  • Thorsten Beck
  • Ross Levine

Abstract

Why do some countries have growth-enhancing financial systems, while others do not? Why have some countries developed the necessary investor protection laws and contract-enforcement mechanisms to support financial institutions and markets, while others have not? This paper reviews existing research on the role of legal institutions in shaping financial development.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10417.

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Date of creation: Apr 2004
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Publication status: published as Menard, Claude and Mary M. Shirley (eds.) Handbook for New Institutional Economics. Norwell MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10417

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