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Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect

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  • Daniel Berkowitz
  • Karina Pistor
  • Jean-Francois Richard

Abstract

We analyze the determinants of effective legal institutions (legality) using data from forty-nine countries. We show that the way the law was initially transplanted and received is a more important determinant than the supply of law from a particular legal family. Countries that have developed legal orders internally, adapted the transplanted law, and/or had a population that was already familiar with basic principles of the transplanted law have more effective legality than countries that received foreign law without any similar pre-dispositions. The transplanting process has a strong indirect effect on economic development via its impact on legality, while the impact of particular legal families is weaker and not robust to alternative legality measures.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number 410.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: 01 Sep 2001
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Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2001-410

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