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Tunnelling

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Author Info

  • Simon Johnson
  • Rafael La Porta
  • Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes
  • Andrei Shleifer

Abstract

Tunnelling is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders. We describe the various forms that tunnelling can take, and examine under what circumstances it is legal. We discuss two important legal principles--the duty of care and the duty of loyalty--which courts use to analyze involving tunnelling. Several important legal cases from France, Belgium, and Italy illustrate how and why the law accommodaates tunnelling in civil law countries, and why certain kinds of tunnelling are less likely to pass legal scrutiny in common law countries.

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File URL: ftp://ftp.repec.org/RePEc/fth/harver/hier1887.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harvard - Institute of Economic Research in its series Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers with number 1887.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:1887

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Web page: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/journals/hier
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Vives,Xavier (ed.), 2000. "Corporate Governance," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521781640, Fall.
  2. Simon Johnson & Peter Boone & Alasdair Breach & Eric Friedman, 1999. "Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 297, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," NBER Working Papers 5879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1840, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, . "Investor Protection and Corporate Governance," Working Paper 19455, Harvard University OpenScholar.
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  1. Inefficient and unfair
    by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2012-01-21 12:53:52
  2. Shares in people
    by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2008-01-25 11:14:10
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