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The Guarantees of Freedom

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Author Info
Andrei Shleifer () (Department of Economics)
Rafael La Porta () (Tuck School of Business)
Florencio Lopez de Silanes () (School of Management)
Cristian Pop-Eleches () (Department of Economics)

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Abstract

Hayek (1960) distinguishes the institutions of English freedom, which guarantee the independence of judges from political interference in the administration of justice, from those of American freedom, which allow judges to restrain law-making powers of the sovereign through constitutional review. We create a data base of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these institutions of English and American freedom, and ask whether these rules predict economic and political freedom in a cross-section of countries. We find that the English institutions of judicial independence are strong predictors of economic freedom and weaker predictors of political freedom. The American institutions of checks and balances are strong predictors of political but not of economic freedom. Judicial independence explains half of the positive effect of common law legal origin on measures of economic freedom.

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Paper provided by Yale School of Management in its series Yale School of Management Working Papers with number ysm261.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 2002
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Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm261

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
P10 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - General
K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)

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  1. Simeon Djankov & Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The New Comparative Economics," NBER Working Papers 9608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2004. "Law and firms'access to finance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3194, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Claessens, Stijn & Laeven, Luc, 2002. "Financial development, property rights, and growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2924, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Francisco Ramos, 2007. "The Establishment of Constitutional Courts: A Study of 128 Democratic Constitutions," Review of Law & Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 6. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Aghion, Philippe & Alesina, Alberto F & Trebbi, Francesco, 2002. "Endogenous Political Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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