Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Tunnelling

Contents:

Author Info

  • Simon Johnson
  • Rafael La Porta
  • Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes
  • Andrei Shleifer

Abstract

Tunnelling is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders. We describe the various forms that tunnelling can take, and examine under what circumstances it is legal. We discuss two important legal principles -- the duty of care and the duty of loyalty -- which courts use to analyze cases involving tunnelling. Several important legal cases from France, Belgium, and Italy illustrate how and why the law accommodates tunnelling in civil law countries, and why certain kinds of tunnelling are less likely to pass legal scrutiny in common law countries.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w7523.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 7523.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7523

Note: CF
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
  2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04.
  3. Johnson, Simon & Boone, Peter & Breach, Alasdair & Friedman, Eric, 2000. "Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 141-186.
  4. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," NBER Working Papers 5879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Vives,Xavier (ed.), 2000. "Corporate Governance," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521781640, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Inefficient and unfair
    by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2012-01-21 12:53:52
  2. Shares in people
    by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2008-01-25 11:14:10
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Bortolotti, Bernardo & Faccio, Mara, 2006. "Reluctant privatization," CEI Working Paper Series 2006-5, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  2. Pawlina, G. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2005. "Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by the Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK," Discussion Paper 2005-23, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Eric Friedman & Simon Johnson & Todd Mitton, 2003. "Propping and Tunneling," NBER Working Papers 9949, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Manoj Pant & Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Gurbachan Singh, 2004. "Financial intermediation and employment," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-22, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  5. Sonja Fagernäs, 2006. "How do family ties, boards and regulation affect pay at the top? Evidence for Indian CEOs," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp335, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
  6. John Armour & B.R. Cheffins & D.A. Skeel Jr., 2002. "Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law in the US and UK," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp226, ESRC Centre for Business Research.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7523. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.