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Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation

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  • Katharina Pistor
  • Chenggang Xu

Abstract

This paper studies the design of law-making and law enforcement institutions based on the premise that law is inherently incomplete. Under incomplete law, law enforcement by courts may suffer from deterrence failure, defined as the social-welfare loss that results from the regime's inability to deter harmful actions. As a potential remedy a regulatory regime is introduced. The major functional difference between courts and regulators is that courts enforce law reactively, that is only once others have initiated law enforcement procedures, while regulators enforce law proactively, i.e. on their own initiative. Proactive law enforcement may be superior in preventing harm. However, it incurs high costs and may err in stopping potentially beneficial activities. We study optimal regime selection between a court and a regulatory regime and present evidence from the history of financial market regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, 2002. "Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 442, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    • Handle: RePEc:cep:stitep:442
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    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2007. "Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(4), pages 627-656, December.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "What Works in Securities Laws?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 1-32, February.
    3. Hoque, Hafiz & Mu, Shaolong, 2021. "Does a reduction of state control affect IPO underpricing? Evidence from the Chinese A-share market," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    4. Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The new comparative economics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 595-619, December.
    5. Xu, Cheng-Gang & Tong, Jian, 2004. "Financial Institutions and the Wealth of Nations: Tales of Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 4348, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Lopez-De-Silanes,Florencio, 2004. "A survey of securities laws and enforcement," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3405, The World Bank.
    7. Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, 2008. "Legal Institutions and Financial Development," Springer Books, in: Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, chapter 11, pages 251-278, Springer.
    8. Tong, Jian & Xu, Chenggang, 2003. "Financial institutions and the wealth of nations: tales of development," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0404, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    9. Fang Fang & Wang Tian & Zhang Yanfei, 2023. "Test on the law protection of minority investors in China: Perspective of misrepresentation in securities market," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(3), pages 1642-1655, April.
    10. Mr. Luc Laeven, 2014. "The Development of Local Capital Markets: Rationale and Challenges," IMF Working Papers 2014/234, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Hutton, Amy & Shu, Susan & Zheng, Xin, 2022. "Regulatory transparency and the alignment of private and public enforcement: Evidence from the public disclosure of SEC comment letters," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 297-321.
    12. Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "Understanding Regulation," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 11(4), pages 439-451, September.
    13. Tong, Jian & Xu, Chenggang, 2003. "Financial institutions and the wealth of nations: tales of development," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 404, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    14. Tjasa Redek & Uros Godnov, 2007. "The Impact of Governance Quality on Economic Growth," Management, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management Koper, vol. 2(2), pages 121-136.
    15. Hokky Situngkir, 2004. "The Structural Dynamics of Corruption: Artificial Society Approach," Computational Economics 0405002, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incomplete law; law enforcement; financial market; regulation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions

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