Regulation and Administered Contracts
AbstractThis paper explores the ramifications of introducing administered contracts -- long term, collective contractual relationships -- into economic analysis with attention being focused on the implicit regulatory contract. The perspective afforded by the administered contracts framework suggests that the economist's case against regulation has been overstated. Many of the problems associated with regulation lie in what is being regulated, not in the act of regulation itself. Further, many of the perceived failures of regulation (for example, entry restrictions) can be seen to have a plausible efficiency rationale.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 7 (1976)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.