A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Agency and Market Theories of Insider Trading
Abstract
The paper summarizes various agency cost and market theories of insider trading propounded over the course of the perennial law and economics debate over insider trading. The paper then suggests three testable hypotheses regarding the relationship between insider trading laws and several measures of financial performance. Using international data and alternative regression specifications, the paper finds that more stringent insider trading laws and enforcement are generally associated with greater ownership dispersion, greater stock price accuracy and greater stock market liquidity. This set of findings provides empirical support to theoretical arguments in favor of more stringent insider trading legislation and enforcement.Download Info
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Paper provided by University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics in its series University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series with number umichlwps-1003.Length:
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Handle: RePEc:bep:uomlwp:umichlwps-1003
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Related research
Keywords:This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-07-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-FIN-2004-07-26 (Finance)
- NEP-FMK-2004-07-26 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-LAW-2004-07-26 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2004-07-26 (Regulation)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Artyom Durnev & Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2001.
"Capital Markets and Capital Allocation: Implications for Economies in Transition,"
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series
417, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Art Durnev & Kan Li & Randall Mørck & Bernard Yeung, 2004. "Capital markets and capital allocation: Implications for economies in transition," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 12(4), pages 593-634, December.
- Kan Li & Randall Morck & Fan Yang & Bernard Yeung, 2003.
"Firm-Specific Variation and Openness in Emerging Markets,"
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series
2003-623, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Kan Li & Randall Morck & Fan Yang & Bernard Yeung, 2004. "Firm-Specific Variation and Openness in Emerging Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(3), pages 658-669, August.
- Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, 2004. "A survey of securities laws and enforcement," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3405, The World Bank.
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