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Insider trading restrictions and top executive compensation

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  • Denis, David J.
  • Xu, Jin

Abstract

The use of equity incentives is significantly greater in countries with stronger insider trading restrictions, and these higher incentives are associated with higher total pay. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of insider trading restrictions and enforcement, and to panel regressions with country fixed effects. We also find significant increases in top executive pay and the use of equity-based incentives in the period immediately following the initial enforcement of insider trading laws. We conclude that insider trading laws are one channel through which cross-country differences in pay practices can be explained.

Suggested Citation

  • Denis, David J. & Xu, Jin, 2013. "Insider trading restrictions and top executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 91-112.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:56:y:2013:i:1:p:91-112
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.04.003
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    Cited by:

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    3. Hu, Fang & Kusnadi, Yuanto & Wang, Jiwei & Wang, Yujie, 2022. "Insider trading restrictions and real activities earnings management: International evidence," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
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    6. Duong, Huu Nhan & Goyal, Abhinav & Kallinterakis, Vasileios & Veeraraghavan, Madhu, 2022. "Democracy and the pricing of initial public offerings around the world," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 322-341.
    7. Marius Cristian Milos & Laura Raisa Milos, 2017. "Regulation, Insider Trading And Stock Market Reaction. What Do We Know?," Annals - Economy Series, Constantin Brancusi University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1, pages 174-179, December.
    8. Kusnadi, Yuanto, 2015. "Insider trading restrictions and corporate risk-taking," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(PA), pages 125-142.
    9. Chang, Millicent & Wee, Marvin, 2016. "The effect of voluntary versus mandatory adoption of trading policies on the returns to insider trades," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 76-87.
    10. Chen, Shenglan & Ma, Hui & Wu, Qiang & Zhang, Hao, 2023. "Does common ownership constrain managerial rent extraction? Evidence from insider trading profitability," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    11. Fang, Hongyan & Song, Zhihui & Nofsinger, John R. & Wang, Yuyue, 2017. "Trading restrictions and firm dividends: The share lockup expiration experience in China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 83-98.
    12. Neupane, Biwesh & Thapa, Chandra & Marshall, Andrew & Neupane, Suman, 2021. "Mimicking insider trades," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    13. Moshirian, Fariborz & Tian, Xuan & Zhang, Bohui & Zhang, Wenrui, 2021. "Stock market liberalization and innovation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(3), pages 985-1014.
    14. Pham, Man Duy (Marty), 2022. "Management friendship and insider opportunism," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    15. Jiang, Chao & Wintoki, M. Babajide & Xi, Yaoyi, 2021. "Insider trading and the legal expertise of corporate executives," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    16. Kallunki, Juha-Pekka & Mikkonen, Jenni & Nilsson, Henrik & Setterberg, Hanna, 2016. "Tax noncompliance and insider trading," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 157-173.
    17. Stefano Colonnello & Giuliano Curatola & Shuo Xia, 2022. "Trading Away Incentives," Working Papers 2022:16, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    18. Goldman, Nathan C. & Ozel, Naim Bugra, 2023. "Executive compensation, individual-level tax rates, and insider trading profits," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1).
    19. Siti Aisyah Ahmad Kamal* & Suhaily Hasnan & Ahmad Fawwaz Mohd Nassaruddin, 2018. "Corporate Governance and Insider Trading: Evidence from Malaysia," The Journal of Social Sciences Research, Academic Research Publishing Group, pages 31-39:2.
    20. Chang, Millicent & Watson, Iain, 2015. "Delayed disclosure of insider trades: Incentives for and indicators of future performance?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(PA), pages 182-197.
    21. Brodmann, Jennifer & Unsal, Omer & Hassan, M. Kabir, 2019. "Political lobbying, insider trading, and CEO compensation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 548-565.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Insider trading restrictions; Executive compensation; Insider ownership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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