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Insider trading legislation and corporate governance

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  • Maug, Ernst
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

    Volume (Year): 46 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 9 (October)
    Pages: 1569-1597

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:9:p:1569-1597

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    1. Sudipto Bhattacharya, 2001. "Insider Trading, Investment, and Liquidity: A Welfare Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 56(3), pages 1141-1156, 06.
    2. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November.
    3. Paul R. Milgrom, 1979. "Good Nevs and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 407R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1788, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    5. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fershtman, Chaim, 1994. "Insider Trading and the Managerial Choice among Risky Projects," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(01), pages 1-14, March.
    6. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, . "Law and Finance," Working Paper 19451, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    7. Ernst Maug, 1998. "Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 65-98, 02.
    8. Noe, Thomas H, 1997. "Insider Trading and the Problem of Corporate Agency," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 287-318, October.
    9. Peter M. DeMarzo & Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 1998. "The Optimal Enforcement of Insider Trading Regulations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 602-632, June.
    10. Bernhardt, Dan & Hollifield, Burton & Hughson, Eric, 1993. "Investment and Insider Trading," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 830, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    11. Khanna, Naveen & Slezak, Steve L & Bradley, Michael, 1994. "Insider Trading, Outside Search, and Resource Allocation: Why Firms and Society May Disagree on Insider Trading Restrictions," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(3), pages 575-608.
    12. Leland, Hayne E, 1992. "Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 859-87, August.
    13. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
    14. Fischer, Paul E, 1992. " Optimal Contracting and Insider Trading Restrictions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 673-94, June.
    15. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 678-709, August.
    16. Marco Pagano & Ailsa Röell, 1998. "The Choice Of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, And The Decision To Go Public," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 187-225, February.
    17. Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, 2002. "The World Price of Insider Trading," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 75-108, 02.
    18. Ausubel, Lawrence M, 1990. "Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1022-41, December.
    19. Skinner, Douglas J., 1997. "Earnings disclosures and stockholder lawsuits," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 249-282, November.
    20. Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer, 1988. "A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price Variability," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 3-40.
    21. Haddock, David D & Macey, Jonathan R, 1987. "Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 311-52, October.
    22. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 1992. "Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 106-122, Spring.
    23. Manove, Michael, 1989. "The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 823-45, November.
    24. Jarrell, Gregg A. & Poulsen, Annette B., 1988. "Dual-class recapitalizations as antitakeover mechanisms : The recent evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 129-152, January.
    25. Bhagat, Sanjai & Jefferis, Richard H., 1991. "Voting power in the proxy process : The case of antitakeover charter amendments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 193-225, November.
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