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Insider trading and the problem of corporate agency

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Author Info
Thomas H. Noe

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Abstract

This paper models an economy in which managers, whose efforts affect firm performance, are able to make "inside" trades on claims whose value is also dependent on firm performance. Managers are able to trade only on "good news," that is, on returns above market expectations. Further, managers cannot trade at all unless permission for such trading is granted by shareholders. Insider trading is in derivative securities and thus does not adversely affect the firm's cost of raising funds. In this setting, it is shown that a prohibition on insider trading may still generate welfare improvement over a regime that allows shareholders to determine insider trading policy. This result obtains because insider trading, although improving managerial effort incentives for any fixed compensation level, also improves the bargaining position of shareholders relative to managers. This reduces the willingness of shareholders to provide expensive effort-assuring managerial compensation packages.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in its series Working Paper with number 95-2.

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Date of creation: 1995
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, October 1997
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedawp:95-2

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Related research
Keywords: Stock market ; Securities;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Manove, Michael, 1989. "The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 823-45, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer, 1988. "A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price Variability," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 3-40. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Ausubel, Lawrence M, 1990. "Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1022-41, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 1992. "Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 106-122, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Laura Beny, 2006. "Do Investors Value Insider Trading Laws? International Evidence," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp837, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  2. Peter-Jan Engelen & Luc Van Liedekerke, 2006. "An Ethical Analysis of Regulating Insider Trading," Working Papers 06-05, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jie Hu & Thomas H. Noe, 1997. "The insider trading debate," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 4, pages 34-45. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jie Hu & Thomas H. Noe, 1997. "Insider trading, costly monitoring, and managerial incentives," Working Paper 97-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Christine Jolls, 2000. "Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth," NBER Working Papers 6919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

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