This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Ausubel, Lawrence M
Abstract

It is often argued that efficiency considerations require society to freely permit insider trading. In this article, an opposing efficiency argument is formalized. The model incorporates an investment stage followed by a trading stage. If "outsiders" expect "insiders" to take advantage of them in trading, outsiders will reduce their investment. The insiders' loss from this diminished investor confidence may more than offset their trading gains. Consequently, a prohibition on insider trading may effect a Pareto improvement. Insiders are made better off if they can precommit not to trade on their privileged information; government regulation accomplished exactly this. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199012%2980%3A5%3C1022%3AITIARE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 80 (1990)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 1022-41
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:80:y:1990:i:5:p:1022-41

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Juan Hatchondo, 2004. "The value of information with heterogeneous agents and partially revealing prices," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 175, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  2. James Dow & Gary Gorton, 1994. "Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management, and Economic Welfare," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 95-10, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Chaim Fershtman, 1990. "The Effects of Insider Trading on Insiders' Choice Among Risky Investment Projects," Discussion Papers 897, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Medrano, Luis Angel & Vives, Xavier, 2002. "Regulating Insider Trading when Investment Matters," CEPR Discussion Papers 3292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Laura Beny, . "A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Agency and Market Theories of Insider Trading," University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series umichlwps-1003, University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ajeyo Banerjee & E. Woodrow Eckard, 2001. "Why Regulate Insider Trading? Evidence from the First Great Merger Wave (1897-1903)," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1329-1349, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Chi-Wen Lee & Zemin Lu, 2008. "Trading on inside information when there may be tippees," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 241-260, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Art A. Durnev & Amrita S. Nain, 2004. "The Unanticipated Effects of Insider Trading Regulation," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-695, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Antonio Bernardo & Kenneth Judd, 1997. "Efficiency of Asset Markets with Asymmetric Information," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management 1130, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Laura Nyantung Beny, 2005. "Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp741, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  11. Gehrig, Thomas & Menkhoff, Lukas, 2003. "The use of flow analysis in foreign exchange: exploratory evidence," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-276, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. David Bodoff & Hugo Levecq & Hongtao Zhang, 2006. "EDGAR on the internet: The welfare effects of wider information distribution in an experimental market for risky assets," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 361-381, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Diego García & Branko Urosevic, 2004. "Noise and Aggregation of Information in Large Markets," Economics Working Papers 785, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  14. Jie Hu & Thomas H. Noe, 1997. "The insider trading debate," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 4, pages 34-45. [Downloadable!]
  15. Franklin Allen & Richard Herring, 2001. "Banking Regulation versus Securities Market Regulation," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 01-29, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  16. Julan Du & Shang-Jin Wei, 2003. "Does Insider Trading Raise Market Volatility?," IMF Working Papers 03/51, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Thomas H. Noe, 1995. "Insider trading and the problem of corporate agency," Working Paper 95-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Jie Hu & Thomas H. Noe, 1997. "Insider trading, costly monitoring, and managerial incentives," Working Paper 97-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There is a FAQ (frequently asked questions).

This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.