Regulating Insider Trading When Investment Matters
AbstractWe provide a general framework for analyzing the effects of insider trading on real investment and welfare as well as the consequences of different regulatory policies in a model where all traders are rational expected-utility maximizers and aware of their position in the market. We find that: with costly information acquisition, an "abstain-or-disclose" rule tends to be optimal; with free information acquisition, laissez-faire is better. This suggests enforcing an abstain-or-disclose rule with a high standard of proof for inside information. Our approach also uncovers the pitfalls of welfare analysis in the noise-trader model.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal European Finance Review.
Volume (Year): 8 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://springerlink.metapress.com/link.asp?id=111870
Other versions of this item:
- Medrano, Luis Angel & Vives, Xavier, 2002. "Regulating Insider Trading when Investment Matters," CEPR Discussion Papers 3292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
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