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Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Sonin, Konstantin
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Comparative Economics .
Volume (Year): 31 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 715-731
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:31:y:2003:i:4:p:715-731Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622864
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"Courts: the Lex Mundi Project ,"
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Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002.
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Daniel Berkowitz and David N. DeJong & Daniel Berkowitz and David N. DeJong, 1999.
"Accounting for Growth in Post-Soviet Russia ,"
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256, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School.
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