Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style
AbstractBased on a unique data set on Russian city budgets, this paper shows that revenue sharing between regional and local governments provides local governments with no incentive to increase tax base or provide public goods. Any change in local government’s own revenues is almost entirely offset by changes in shared revenues. This leads to governmental over-regulation of private businesses. It is shown that fiscal incentives are a determinant of the formation of private business and the efficiency of public goods provision. The Russian federalism is compared to the Chinese federalism, where fiscal incentives reputedly are stronger in many provinces.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0001.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2000
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Federalism; Russia; Local government; Transition;
Other versions of this item:
- Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina V., 2000. "Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 337-368, June.
- Zhuravskaya Ekatherina, 2000. "Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, Russian Style," EERC Working Paper Series 99-15e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- O57 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries
- P35 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance
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