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'Plata o Plomo': Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence

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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2002-28.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-28

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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  1. Douglas Gale & Xavier Vives, 2002. "Dollarization, Bailouts, And The Stability Of The Banking System," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 117(2), pages 467-502, May.
  2. Julio J. Rotemberg, 2003. "Commercial Policy with Altruistic Voters," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 174-201, February.
  3. Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
  4. Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
  5. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 503-30, May.
  6. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
  7. Clare Leaver & Miltiadis Makris, 2006. "Passive Industry Interests in a Large Polity," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(4), pages 571-602, October.
  8. Francesco Caselli & Massimo Morelli, 2001. "Bad Politicians," NBER Working Papers 8532, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 2002. "The Corporate Governance Role of the Media," NBER Working Papers 9309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
  11. Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn.
  12. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
  13. Ernesto Dal Bo & Rafael Di Tella, 2003. "Capture by Threat," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1123-1152, October.
  14. Helpman, E. & Persson, T., 1998. "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," Papers, Tel Aviv 08-98, Tel Aviv.
  15. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-64, August.
  16. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Legal Origins," NBER Working Papers 8272, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February.
  18. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  19. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
  20. David P. Baron, 2001. "Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 7-45, 03.
  21. Rasmusen, Eric & Ramseyer, J Mark, 1994. " Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 305-27, March.
  22. Konrad, Kai A. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 1997. "Credible threats in extortion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 23-39, May.
  23. Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-35, December.
  24. Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-41, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Simeon Djankov & Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The New Comparative Economics," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 2002, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Ethan Bueno De Mesquita & Catherine Hafer, 2008. "Public Protection Or Private Extortion?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 1-32, 03.
  3. Frederico Finan & Claudio Ferraz, 2009. "Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance," Working Papers id:1889, eSocialSciences.
  4. David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2007. "Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 599-634, 09.
  5. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Jason Snyder, 2007. "Political Dynasties," NBER Working Papers 13122, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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