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Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries: The Effects of Local Corruption and Tax Evasion

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  • Jan K. Brueckner

    (Department of Economics and Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Abstract

A movement toward fiscal decentralization is underway in many countries across the world. This movement is partly justified by appeal to the classic argument of Tiebout (1956), who claimed that decentralized provision of public goods allows better fulfillment of diverse individual demands. Many commentators, however, have expressed concern that the conditions justifying Tiebout's argument are not present in many developing countries. This paper analyzes the consequences of altering Tiebout's model to include local corruption and tax evasion, which may exist in many developing countries. The analysis shows that these forces indeed limit the benefits from fiscal decentralization. By raising public-good costs, corruption cancels some of the gains from better demand fulfillment, which arise as Tiebout sorting generates homogeneous local jurisdictions. By creating incentives for mixing, thereby preventing formation of homogeneous communities, tax evasion may block the operation of the Tiebout mechanism, eliminating the gains from fiscal decentralization.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan K. Brueckner, 2000. "Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries: The Effects of Local Corruption and Tax Evasion," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2000:v:1:i:1:p:1-18
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Xie, Danyang & Zou, Heng-fu & Davoodi, Hamid, 1999. "Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in the United States," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 228-239, March.
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    3. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    4. Wallace E. Oates & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Development," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 21, pages 377-383, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Jan K. Brueckner, 1999. "Fiscal Federalism and Capital Accumulation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(2), pages 205-224, April.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal decentralization; Corruption; Tax evasion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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